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PERSONAL JURISDICTION BASED ON THE LOCAL
EFFECTS OF INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT
ALLAN ERBSEN*
ABSTRACT
Intentional misconduct frequently has extraterritorial conse-
quences. Terrorist attacks, toxic pollution, civil rights violations, and
other intentional torts can cause harm within a state despite orig-
inating outside the state. Those harms raise a vexing constitutional
question: when do the local effects of intentional wrongdoing autho-
rize personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose conduct occurred
outside the forum? The answer has several significant implications.
Granting or denying jurisdiction can support or undermine regula-
tory interests by allocating power between states, imposes burdens on
the parties that can impede access to justice, and alters risk assess-
ments that shape both socially desirable and socially destructive
behavior.
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The jurisdictional dilemma posed by the in-state effects of out-of-
state conduct is timeless and timely. It is timeless because it has aris-
en in thousands of cases and is an unavoidable feature of a federal
system that allocates judicial power between fifty coequal states. It
is timely because the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Walden v.
Fiore directly addressed effects jurisdiction for the first time since
1984.
This Article critiques Walden and proposes a new approach to
the broader constitutional question by focusing on five conclusions.
First, it illustrates how Walden relies on a distinction between a
defendant’s contacts with the forum state and a defendant’s contacts
with the forum’s residents. Second, it critiques the forum/resident
distinction as imprecise, misleading, and a revival of the formality
that plagued nineteenth-century personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
It also offers a new account of Chief Justice Stone’s reasoning in
International Shoe, a case about enforcing taxes, by comparing Shoe
to Stone’s strikingly similar opinion in a case about imposing taxes.
The comparison highlights Shoe’s hostility toward the sort of for-
mality that animates Walden. Third, it contends that lower courts
might salvage the Court’s emphasis on forum contacts by focusing on
the defendant’s contacts with the forum’s law, in effect merging
constitutional limits on the state’s legislative and judicial power.
Fourth, it suggests that state regulatory interests are more important
than commonly recognized when local effects are severe, such as an
Ebola quarantine. Fifth, it proposes a new approach to analyzing
jurisdiction by considering whether actors who commit intentional
torts without a geographic focal point assume the risk of being sued
wherever harm occurs.
These conclusions suggest that Walden’s reasoning would be mis-
leading if read literally and acontextually. The opinion leaves more
room for exercising jurisdiction in effects cases than its dismissive
veneer implies.
2015] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 387
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
I. A SIMPLE MODEL OF EFFECTS CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
II. THE SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS EFFECTS JURISDICTION: 
CALDER AND WALDEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
A. Calder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
1. The Long Arm of Tabloid Journalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
2. A New Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
3. Ambiguities in the New Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
B. Walden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
1. Gambling on Effects Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
2. The Holding Hinges on the Court’s Distinction 
Between Contacts with the Forum and Contacts with 
Forum Residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
3. Reframing Calder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
4. Maneuvering Room in Walden’s Reasoning . . . . . . . . . 416
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE EFFECTS TEST FOR FUTURE 
CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
A. Reframing the Aiming Inquiry by Refining the 
Forum/Resident Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
1. The Forum/Resident Distinction Is Imprecise and 
Needlessly Formal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
a. The Court Did Not Require Contacts with 
State Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
b. The Court Might Have Required Contacts with 
States as Incorporeal Entities, but Such a 
Requirement Would Be Incoherent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
c. Whether the Forum/Resident Distinction Requires 
Contact with Territory or an Entity, It Needlessly 
Revives Archaic Formal Approaches to Jurisdiction 
that the Court Repudiated in International Shoe . . 422
2. Two Hypothetical Examples Illustrate How the 
Forum/Resident Distinction’s Emphasis on Motives 
Obscures the Importance of State Regulatory Interests 
in Justifying the Exercise of State Power . . . . . . . . . . . 427
388 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:385
3. Salvaging the Forum/Resident Distinction: Linking 
Jurisdiction and Limits on the Extraterritorial 
Application of State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
B. Overlooked Factors that Should Guide the Effects Test: The 
Importance of State Regulatory Interests When Out-of-State 
Conduct Causes Local Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
1. Nature and Extent of Local Injury: Reimagining Walden as 
a Case About Ebola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
2. Assumption of Jurisdictional Risk: The Defendant’s 
Knowledge that Her Conduct Is Wrongful and Could 
Lead to Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
3. Reckless Entanglement with the Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
2015] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 389
INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes a constitutional question that implicates
thousands of cases, myriad fields of substantive law, and a 2014 Su-
preme Court decision whose unanimity obscures deep confusion and
disagreement. The problem seems simple: if a defendant’s inten-
tional conduct outside a state causes harm inside the state, may the
state’s courts provide a remedy? The illusion of simplicity crumbles
when one considers the many contexts in which this “effects” sce-
nario can arise. For example, suppose that: victims of the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks sue foreign organizations that funded the hijackers,
a movie studio sues an out-of-state hacker who crippled its computer
network, residents of a town sue an out-of-state polluter whose toxic
emissions poisoned their water supply, or civil rights activists sue
out-of-state police officers who wrongfully prevented their return
home to participate in a protest. Each case raises the same vexing
question: under what circumstances can the local effects of foreign
conduct justify personal jurisdiction? The answer has several signif-
icant consequences. Granting or denying jurisdiction can support or
undermine regulatory interests by allocating power between states,
imposes burdens on the parties that can impede access to justice,
and alters risk assessments that shape both socially desirable and
socially destructive behavior.
Effects cases have befuddled courts for decades.1 The Supreme
Court first addressed the problem in Calder v. Jones2 in 1984 and
then revisited it in Walden v. Fiore3 in 2014. More than three thou-
sand judicial opinions have cited Calder.4 In less than two years,
1. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD ET AL., JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND
PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 113 n.123 (4th ed.
2014) (listing cases); C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test
of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 617-19 (2006) (discussing “widespread divergence among the lower
courts”).
2. 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984).
3. 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014).
4. This figure is based on WestlawNext’s “citing references” feature as of October 23,
2015. Citing References for Calder v. Jones, WESTLAWNEXT, http://westlawnext.com (search
“465 U.S. 783”; click on “Citing References”; click on “Cases”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
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more than 400 opinions have cited Walden.5 Confusion persists
because Calder and Walden rely on imprecise tests that are often a
poor fit for the diverse scenarios in which local effects are relevant.6
Both opinions also overlook normative questions about why states
in a federal system may exercise authority over outsiders.7 A more
nuanced account of state power is essential for determining when
defendants may resist jurisdiction.
State borders frame judicial power by creating an inside and
outside. Insiders are subject to personal jurisdiction simply because
they are insiders.8 But exercising jurisdiction over outsiders re-
quires applying intricate balancing tests.9 These balancing tests
often produce clear answers when conduct and its consequences are
clustered either entirely within or completely outside the forum
state. Outsiders who act in the forum state and cause injury in the
forum are usually subject to jurisdiction.10 However, outsiders who
act outside the forum and cause injury outside the forum are usual-
ly immune from jurisdiction.11
Hard cases abound because the events underlying litigation fre-
quently sprawl across borders. Disputes can involve a mix of insid-
ers and outsiders, local and foreign conduct, and local and foreign
effects. This geographic medley creates two types of problems when
analyzing personal jurisdiction.
5. Citing References for Walden v. Fiore, WESTLAWNEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (search
“134 S. Ct. 1115;” click on “Citing References;” click on “Cases”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part III.
8. “Insider” has both a geographic and normative connotation. I use the term
descriptively rather than normatively to label actors subject to general jurisdiction under
whatever criteria the Court chooses to use. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011) (“[T]he paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction
is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”); cf. Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at
Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 543-44 (2012) (considering whether being at
“home” is synonymous with being an “insider”).
9. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755-56 (2014) (contrasting “general” and
“specific” jurisdiction).
10. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (upholding jurisdiction in
Washington in suit to collect taxes linked to the activities of defendant’s agents in Washing-
ton).
11. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980) (rejecting jurisdiction in Minnesota over
an Indiana resident who caused a car accident in Indiana).
2015] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 391
First, courts often must identify the location of contacts that lack
a clear physical dimension. Spatialization can be tricky, raising
questions about the situs of ethereal communication (such as
Internet activity), intangible property (such as a copyright), and in-
formational harm (such as defamation).12 Attempts to situate ab-
stract phenomena within political borders can become misleading
distractions when courts prioritize fictional locations over more sali-
ent indicia of state authority.13 The risk of distraction does not obvi-
ate efforts to determine where conduct occurred and where harms
were experienced, but courts should carefully consider why they ask
such questions and how much weight to put on the answers.14
Second, after identifying geographic contacts, courts must decide
why these contacts matter. Jurisdiction may be hazy if several vari-
ables seem relevant—such as the location of conduct, the site of ef-
fects, and where the defendant aimed its activities—yet some have
an “inside” label while others have an “outside” label. Which vari-
ables are important, and are some more important than others?
Identifying, analyzing, and weighing variables is intrinsically
difficult. The Supreme Court has compounded that difficulty by
formulating jurisprudence that is unprincipled, unstable, and un-
helpful.15
This Article critiques current jurisprudence in an especially
vexing category of cases and suggests factors that can guide lower
courts. Part I frames the inquiry by identifying the key features of
“effects” jurisdiction. Part II then analyzes Calder and Walden and
identifies ambiguities in their reasoning that limit their usefulness.
Part III explores and suggests answers to several open questions,
reaching five primary conclusions. First, it illustrates how Walden
relies on a distinction between a defendant’s contacts with the
forum state and a defendant’s contacts with the forum’s residents.
12. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007)
(exploring space metaphors in the context of regulating the Internet).
13. See infra Part III.A.1.
14. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (“Whether due process is satisfied” does not rest on a
“mechanical or quantitative” calculus, but “must depend rather upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure”).
15. See Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. 1301, 1304 (2014) (“The one thing jurisdiction scholars agree on is the sad state of
personal jurisdiction law.”).
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Second, it critiques the forum/resident distinction as imprecise,
misleading, and a revival of the formality that plagued nineteenth-
century personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. It also offers a new ac-
count of Chief Justice Stone’s reasoning in International Shoe,16 a
case about enforcing taxes, by comparing Shoe to Stone’s strikingly
similar opinion in a case about imposing taxes. The comparison
highlights Shoe’s hostility toward the sort of formality that ani-
mates Walden. Third, it contends that lower courts might salvage
the Court’s emphasis on forum contacts by focusing on the defen-
dant’s contacts with the forum’s law, in effect merging constitutional
limits on the state’s legislative and judicial power. Fourth, it
suggests that state regulatory interests are more important than
commonly recognized when local effects are severe, such as an Ebola
quarantine. Fifth, it proposes a new approach to analyzing jurisdic-
tion by considering whether actors who commit intentional torts
without a geographic focal point assume the risk of being sued
wherever harm occurs. 
These conclusions suggest that Walden’s reasoning would be
misleading if read literally and acontextually. The opinion leaves
more room for exercising jurisdiction in effects cases than its dismis-
sive veneer implies.
My analysis indicates that jurisdiction in effects cases will often
be appropriate given the importance of state regulatory interests.
That conclusion implicates a normative question animating scholar-
ship about the proper function of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Scholars have identified at least two conflicting approaches to
justifying limits on state power to exercise personal jurisdiction over
outsiders whose conduct causes harm in the forum. One focuses on
horizontal federalism while the other focuses on what I call voli-
tional localization. The horizontal federalism approach treats juris-
diction as a problem involving the allocation of regulatory authority
between coequal states in a federal system. I have defended this
approach in prior work.17 The central question is whether the forum
16. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.
17. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1 (2010) [hereinafter
Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction]; Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
Around Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction]. Other
scholars have also focused on the allocation of regulatory authority. See, e.g., Geoffrey P.
2015] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 393
state has an interest sufficient to justify the assertion of power
given the interests of other states, national interests, and the defen-
dant’s interest in avoiding an unlawful exercise of authority. In con-
trast, volitional localization approaches emphasize the geographic
dimension of a defendant’s choices. Relevant factors may include
whether the defendant purposefully directed conduct toward the
forum, anticipated contacts with the forum, had an opportunity to
avoid the forum, or otherwise established a meaningful affiliation
with the forum.18
The horizontal federalism and volitional localization approaches
have distinct starting assumptions and priorities but can consider
the same variables.19 For example, weighing state interests from a
horizontal federalism perspective could entail considering the defen-
dant’s choices, while the significance of a volitional act aimed at the
forum might vary depending on the magnitude of state interests.20
Miller, In Search of the Most Adequate Forum: State Court Personal Jurisdiction, 2 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 24 (2014) (“horizontal federalism” principles can help identify “the tribunal
that can resolve the controversy at the lowest social cost”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 650-51 (2006) (stating that
jurisdiction hinges on whether the forum state has a “legitimate” interest linked to its “police
power”); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 734 (1987) (“A more coherent doctrine can be constructed
if the courts would acknowledge expressly the sovereign allocation function of jurisdictional
rules.”); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 266 (2004) (proposing “a common law
model rooted in interstate federalism”). A related perspective does not focus directly on the
allocation of power within a federal system, but considers whether the connection between the
suit and the forum is sufficient to ensure that jurisdiction is not arbitrary. See Alan M.
Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 504 (2015).
18. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Reconceiving Personal Jurisdiction: Sovereignty, Author-
ity, and Individual Rights 5 (Univ. of Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 13, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564300 [http://
perma.cc/Q43B-C3QJ] (focusing on whether defendants “could not realistically have avoided
the power of the forum state by limiting the geographical scope of their activities”); Roger H.
Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849,
853 (1989) (focusing on “political consent,” which “is an intangible or hypothetical consent
inferred from the [defendant’s] activities”).
19. An alternative way of framing the schism juxtaposes “public ordering”/tort-based and
“private ordering”/contract-based approaches to fairness. Stein, supra note 17, at 691. That
perspective illuminates subtle dimensions of the Court’s reasoning and helps situate personal
jurisdiction doctrine within broader trends in due process jurisprudence. But I prefer to focus
on horizontal federalism because it links personal jurisdiction doctrine to other power alloca-
tion rules that rely on provisions of the Constitution aside from the Due Process Clause.
20. For a discussion of how the two approaches overlap, see Erbsen, Reorienting Personal
394 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:385
Both approaches also consider whether litigation in the forum would
impose undue burdens on the defendant. Burdens factor into the
jurisdictional inquiry as a “fairness” or “reasonableness” factor,21 but
could—and I have contended should—be spun off into a distinct
constitutional analysis of venue.22
This Article does not revisit the debate about why the Constitu-
tion limits personal jurisdiction. Instead, it sketches arguments that
adherents of both the horizontal federalism and volitional localiza-
tion approaches could potentially embrace and that might guide
courts struggling to implement ambiguous precedent in effects cases.
Further scholarship can explore in more detail how each argument
would fare under particular normative theories of jurisdiction.
I. A SIMPLE MODEL OF EFFECTS CASES
A single constitutional test nominally applies to all cases in which
a state court attempts to exercise personal jurisdiction over outsid-
ers. Jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause23 only
when the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum such
that being compelled to appear is consistent with “fair play and
substantial justice.”24 This subjective test requires close attention to
context, yet many fact patterns frequently recur. The Supreme
Court has refined the “minimum contacts” inquiry by developing
subsidiary doctrines to govern various types of recurring interac-
tions between the defendant and the forum. For example, the Court
has tailored doctrine to suits arising from contractual relation-
Jurisdiction, supra note 17. Some approaches do not fit neatly into either the horizontal feder-
alism or volitional localization categories because they blend concern about the defendant’s
choices with concern about the proper allocation of power between states. See, e.g., Daniel
Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245, 248 (2014) (focusing on
“policy considerations relevant to the design of welfare-enhancing jurisdictional rules”); id.
at 294 (noting connections between “fairness” and “federalism”).
21. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (“The protection
against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of ‘reasonableness’ or ‘fair-
ness.’”).
22. See Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at 18-32 (discussing potential
constitutional limits on venue); see also Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional
Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153 (2014).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
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ships,25 commercial activity within the forum,26 commercial activity
outside the forum,27 and ownership of property.28 Additional tail-
oring may occur as novel problems arise. For example, the Court
seems especially skittish about “virtual contacts” over the Internet.29
This Article assumes that fragmenting personal jurisdiction doc-
trine into context-sensitive variations is appropriate. Scholars have
debated the wisdom of drawing such lines and the particular lines
that the Court has drawn.30 But courts apparently think that com-
partmentalization is helpful when translating an abstract governing
standard into context-sensitive outcomes.31 I focus here on the prac-
tical implications of jurisprudence governing effects scenarios and
therefore frame the problem in a way that parallels how courts ap-
proach cases.32
25. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985) (focusing on whether
the defendant “reach[ed] out beyond” the forum) (citation omitted).
26. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984) (upholding juris-
diction based on “regular circulation of magazines in the forum State”).
27. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opin-
ion) (rejecting jurisdiction in product liability action against out-of-state manufacturer).
28. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (providing examples of how “the pres-
ence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts
among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation”).
29. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014) (“We leave questions about virtual
contacts for another day.”); cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (noting that
“technological progress” can alter the stakes in jurisdictional analysis by enhancing state
interests and minimizing burdens on defendants).
30. Compare Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 230 (1967) (“[T]he [minimum contacts] test,
however phrased, must be adapted to the needs of each of the environments in which it must
operate.”), with Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 1, at 626-27 (contending that doctrin-
al fragmentation creates “difficulty in selecting which test to apply” and confusion about how
to interpret the varying tests), and Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
in all Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1158-59 (1989) (propos-
ing that in federal courts “[p]ersonal jurisdiction ... should be applied consistently across dif-
ferent areas of law, so long as the sovereign power remains the same”).
31. For example, the table of contents of an exhaustive treatise on personal jurisdiction
reveals dozens of categories into which courts have, to varying degrees, pigeonholed cases. See
1 CASAD ET AL., supra note 1, at iv-viii.
32. Walden and Calder both confined their analysis to intentional torts. See Walden, 134
S. Ct. at 1126 (framing holding in terms of the “proper focus” for due process analysis “in
intentional-tort cases”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (distinguishing precedent
involving “untargeted negligence”). The Court has never clearly instructed lower courts either
to develop or refrain from developing context-specific personal jurisdiction rules that would
implement broadly applicable constitutional standards. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against
Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 701-03 (2014).
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This Part defines a particular recurring scenario—which I label
the “effects problem”—in order to place subsequent discussion of
case law in context. The label highlights the critical jurisdictional
inquiry: under what circumstances do the local effects of foreign
conduct justify personal jurisdiction?
State and federal courts routinely encounter “effects” cases that
share at least six common features. The components of the problem
are that: (1) an outsider defendant (2) acted outside the forum in a
way that (3) caused harm inside the forum absent (4) a contractual
relationship with the plaintiff or (5) commercial distribution of prod-
ucts, and (6) there is no shortcut around a fact-intensive jurisdic-
tional inquiry.
First, the defendant is an outsider. If the defendant were an
insider, “general” or “all purpose” jurisdiction would exist without
regard to the local effects of the defendant’s conduct.33 We can
bracket precisely what distinguishes an insider from an outsider.
For example, the bar for being an insider might be high: domicile for
individuals and being “at home” for corporations.34 Or the bar could
be lower, such that extensive local business activity would be suf-
ficient to make the actor an insider.35 But by whatever definition we
use, the defendant in effects cases is an outsider who is subject to
jurisdiction, if at all, based only on contacts with the forum that are
relevant to the suit.36
33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. If general jurisdiction were not available, the
defendant’s insider connection to the forum may blur assessments of where her conduct oc-
curred, her purpose, and the benefits that she received from her conduct. Courts might there-
fore skew their implementation of the effects inquiry when addressing an insider as opposed
to an otherwise similarly situated outsider.
34. I define “insider” tautologically as a label for actors subject to general jurisdiction
under whatever standard the Court applies. See supra note 8.
35. See Richard D. Freer, Four Specific Problems with General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 17), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2490034 [http://perma.cc/7DRZ-9SWK].
36. The test for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant contacts is fuzzy. Contacts are
relevant for establishing specific jurisdiction only when the plaintiff ’s claim “arise[s] out of
or relate[s] to” them. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). For
a discussion of the many conflicting rules that courts use to implement this standard, see
Ryne H. Ballou, Note, Be More Specific: Vague Precedents and the Differing Standards by
Which to Apply “Arises out of or Relates to” in the Test for Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 35
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 663, 668-79 (2013).
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Second, the defendant acted outside the forum. Determining
whether an act occurred inside or outside a particular place can be
tricky. For example, if the defendant used a computer in Florida to
hack into a server in Delaware in order to steal money from an
account in a Massachusetts-based bank, there might be a question
about where the theft occurred.37 Likewise, cases involving intellec-
tual property—such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights—raise
challenging questions about the situs of infringement.38 But for
present purposes, we can assume that appropriate criteria are avail-
able for determining that conduct occurred outside the forum.
Third, the defendant’s actions caused adverse effects inside the
forum. These consequences can manifest in many forms—including
physical, economic, and psychological—and in varying degrees of
severity.
Fourth, the defendant did not have a contractual or other ongoing
relationship with the plaintiff. Such a relationship could establish
a relevant course of dealing that weighs in favor of jurisdiction in-
dependent of any local effects.39 In contrast, we can assume that the
defendant and the plaintiff, to the extent they directly interacted at
all, did so only in connection with the tortious conduct underlying
the suit.
Fifth, the defendant’s contacts with the forum did not arise from
the distribution of commercial products—at least not to any signif-
icant extent.40 In theory, currents in the “stream of commerce” may
37. Cf. NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 816, 821, 825 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(applying Calder to exercise personal jurisdiction over Australian defendant who allegedly
hacked into a server within the forum). Spatializing banking transactions can determine
which jurisdictional test is applicable. For example, victims of a Hizballah rocket attack in
Israel filed a suit in New York against a Lebanese bank that had funded the terrorists. See
Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013). The bank had “no
operations, branches, or employees in the United States,” but used an account in another New
York bank as a conduit for wiring funds to Hizballah. Id. at 165-66. The Second Circuit
deemed that account sufficient to establish conduct in New York that justified personal
jurisdiction without resorting to the Calder effects test. See id. at 173.
38. See Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 1, at 654-55.
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. Some tangential connection to product distribution is inevitable in many effects cases.
For example, when jurisdiction is premised on the libelous content of a newspaper article, the
fact that the newspaper generates profits from sales does not necessarily require considering
precedents about commercial activity. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (distin-
guishing between the jurisdictional bases for subjecting a newspaper and its reporters to per-
sonal jurisdiction; local sales justified jurisdiction over the paper while the local effects of
398 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:385
ebb and flow in ways that connect distant actors to local fora
through the migration of products.41 These stream of commerce
cases may hinge on a constellation of unique variables that do not
exist in most other effects scenarios. Market participants may have
specialized knowledge about the effects of their conduct, unique ex-
pectations about their jurisdictional footprint, a broad intent to prof-
it from geographically diverse opportunities, and a relatively robust
ability to bear litigation costs in distant fora. Doctrine governing
distribution cases might therefore tolerate jurisdictional entangle-
ments on a larger geographic scale than in non-distribution cases.42
Finally, there is no shortcut around analyzing personal jurisdic-
tion. For example, the defendant did not consent to jurisdiction, did
not waive its objections, and was not served while present in the
forum.43
These elements combine to produce a textbook effects scenario: an
entity that is not involved in commercial distribution and that lacks
relevant prior contacts with the plaintiff and forum engages in
activity outside the forum that causes harm within the forum.44 The
reporting justified jurisdiction over the employees).
41. The Court recently decided a case that “present[ed] an opportunity to provide greater
clarity” about “stream of commerce” analysis. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion). But clarity was elusive. See id. at 2794 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“This case presents no such occasion” to fully revisit the stream
of commerce metaphor).
42. See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961)
(“Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by technological and
economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have been reasonable enough in a sim-
pler economy lose their relation to reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted.”). For
a discussion of how courts have implemented the stream of commerce test, see Kaitlyn Find-
ley, Comment, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of Commerce Doctrine: Interpreting
Justice Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly Inviting Lower Courts to Develop Alternative
Jurisdictional Standards, 63 EMORY L.J. 695, 730-46 (2014).
43. See 1 CASAD ET AL., supra note 1, at 132-47 (discussing jurisdiction based on presence,
consent, and waiver).
44. Two American Law Institute restatements generally support jurisdiction in effects
cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 421(2)(j) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[A] state’s exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect
to a person or thing is reasonable if ... the person ... carried on outside the state an activity
having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971) (“A state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere ...
unless the nature of the effects and of the individual’s relationship to the state make the
exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.”).
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effects scenario can arise in myriad contexts implicating important
state regulatory interests, including cases about terrorism,45 intel-
lectual property,46 pollution,47 libel,48 and civil liberties.49
II. THE SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS EFFECTS JURISDICTION:
CALDER AND WALDEN
Effects jurisdiction has been a vexing quagmire because the
underlying issues are complex and the Supreme Court has provided
minimal guidance. Only two Supreme Court decisions directly
address the effects problem: Calder v. Jones50 and Walden v. Fiore.51
Both decisions were unanimous, but neither is a beacon of insight.
Each articulates imprecise standards, relies on unstated assump-
tions, and is amenable to conflicting interpretations. This Part
analyzes and critiques both opinions. Part III then explores open
questions and identifies a path toward a more nuanced and coherent
inquiry.
A. Calder
1. The Long Arm of Tabloid Journalism
Calder arose from a scurrilous article in the National Enquirer,
a tabloid whose motto was “Enquiring Minds Want to Know.”52 In
1979, the Enquirer decided that its readers wanted to know gossip
about Shirley Jones, an actress who resided in California. The mag-
45. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 93-95 (2d Cir.
2008) (applying Calder to reject personal jurisdiction in New York over Saudi princes who
allegedly funded al Qaeda).
46. See, e.g., Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 5-6, 7-13 (Cal. 2002) (applying Calder
to reject personal jurisdiction in California over Texas resident who allegedly posted a
California corporation’s trade secrets on the Internet).
47. See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL
2578982, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (applying Calder to allow personal jurisdiction in
Washington over Canadian defendant that polluted a river flowing into Washington).
48. See infra Part II.A.
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
51. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
52. HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES 630 (Margaret A. Blanchard ed.,
1998).
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azine published an article stating that Jones was a “crying drunk”
who “pour[ed] down vodka so fast” that she was “barely able to
make it through the day” and could not fulfill her acting commit-
ments.53
Jones sued the Enquirer and two of its reporters—the article’s
author and editor—for libel in a California state court.54 The case
settled one month after the Supreme Court upheld personal juris-
diction.55 Jones received damages and a “complete retraction.”56
Personal jurisdiction over the reporters was tenuous. Extensive
sales in California subjected the Enquirer to jurisdiction,57 which it
did not contest.58 However, the reporters did not distribute the
magazine; they merely created the content. Jurisdiction over the
reporters therefore could not rest on the Enquirer’s California
circulation,59 but could rest on how the content was related to
California.60 All the content creation occurred in Florida, where the
reporters resided and worked.61 Some of that creative activity in-
cluded incorporating information from sources in California.62 The
author contacted California sources by telephone from Florida, but
the editor did not.63
53. John South, Husband’s Bizarre Behavior Is Driving Shirley Jones to Drink, NAT’L
ENQUIRER (Oct. 9, 1979), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/files/shirley-jones-enquirer.pdf
[perma.cc/QF79-LBYU]. The article also accused Jones’s husband of stealing money from a
church and subjecting aspiring actresses to the “casting couch.” Id. He joined her libel suit but
later voluntarily dismissed his claims. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785 n.1.
54. Jones v. Calder, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825, 826-27 (Ct. App. 1982).
55. Aljean Harmetz, National Enquirer Agrees to Settle with Shirley Jones in Libel Suit,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/27/us/national-enquirer-agrees-
to-settle-with-shirley-jones-in-libel-suit.html [http://perma.cc/6L7T-VWK8].
56. Id.
57. In a different case decided on the same day as Calder, the Court held that “regular
circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction
in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984).
58. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785.
59. See id. at 790 (“Petitioners are correct that their contacts with California are not to
be judged according to their employer’s activities there.”).
60. See id. (“[T]heir status as employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdic-
tion.”).
61. See id. at 785-86.
62. See id. at 785. The parties disputed whether the author had traveled to California
while researching the article, but the Court did not rely on the alleged travel. See id. at 785
n.4.
63. See Jones v. Calder, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827, 829 (Ct. App. 1983).
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These facts produced a textbook effects scenario. Two Florida resi-
dents acting in Florida caused harm in California. They had no prior
contact with the plaintiff and no other relevant contacts with the
forum.64 If jurisdiction existed, they would be forced to defend them-
selves thousands of miles from home. But if jurisdiction did not
exist, the plaintiff would have had to travel that same distance in
order to pursue her claims in an unfamiliar forum.
2. A New Test
The Supreme Court held that the reporters were subject to
personal jurisdiction for a combination of four reasons. First, they
“expressly aimed” and “intentionally directed” their conduct toward
California because they “knew” that Jones resided and worked in
California.65 Second, their conduct was “calculated to cause injury.”66
Third, Jones experienced the “effects” of their conduct in Califor-
nia.67 Finally, California was the “focal point” of the reporters’ mis-
conduct because the article relied on California-based sources, was
published in California, and was about the activities in California
of an actress based in California.68 These four factors established
that the reporters had “minimum contacts” with California such
that they could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.”69
The outcome was fair. One party will inevitably be inconve-
nienced when plaintiffs and defendants reside in different states.
Allocating the burden to the alleged wrongdoer rather than the
alleged victim is often sensible if the burden on the defendant is
manageable.70 In Calder, litigating in California rather than Florida
64. Both reporters had travelled to California for reasons that were unrelated to the
article. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785-86. The Court’s constitutional analysis did not refer to this
travel. See id. at 788-91.
65. Id. at 789-90.
66. Id. at 791.
67. Id. at 789.
68. Id. at 788-89.
69. Id. at 788, 790 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 790 (“An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress
from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California.”);
see also Roy L. Brooks, The Essential Purpose and Analytical Structure of Personal Juris-
diction Law, 27 IND. L. REV. 361, 364 (1993) (“The essential direction of [personal jurisdiction]
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was unlikely to have been burdensome for the reporters, especially
if the Enquirer indemnified them.71 Rejecting personal jurisdiction
would not have spared the reporters from travelling to California
because if the case proceeded to trial they “most likely” would have
been “required to appear as witnesses.”72 Accordingly, once the En-
quirer acquiesced to jurisdiction, the added burden on the reporters
of being parties rather than witnesses was marginal.
Focusing on litigation burdens highlights an odd aspect of Calder:
the parties’ five-year fight about personal jurisdiction may have
been pointless. Jones wanted money and a retraction. The Enquirer
could (and did) provide both.73 Joining the reporters as parties in
theory might have supplied extra pockets from which to collect
damages if the amount of a judgment exceeded the Enquirer’s abil-
ity to pay, but that possibility was remote relative to the costs of
litigating jurisdiction up to the Supreme Court. The Court was sure-
ly sophisticated enough to realize that the reporters were marginal
characters in a larger drama, which might have alleviated any
concerns about elevating them from witnesses to parties. Calder’s
holding therefore may have been a sideshow to Jones’s suit against
the Enquirer, which settled one month after the Court’s decision.74
law is to determine who should travel.”). But see Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable
Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2012) (contending
that the effects test allocates the burden of travel based on an unjustified assumption that the
plaintiff ’s claim has merit).
71. “[M]odern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for
a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” McGee v.
Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, supra
note 17, at 21-26 (noting several factors, including liability insurance, that mitigate defense
costs in distant fora).
72. Jones v. Calder, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (Ct. App. 1982). Exercising jurisdiction over
reporters would be troubling if the fear of jurisdiction in distant fora chilled protected speech
on topics related to those fora. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defam-
ation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 259-60 (1987). Calder
recognized that First Amendment concerns animated “substantive” libel law and declined to
“double count[ ]” “those concerns at the jurisdictional stage.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
73. The Supreme Court noted the trial court’s observation that Jones’s “rights could be
‘fully satisfied’ in her suit against the publisher without requiring [the reporters] to appear
as parties.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 786.
74. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Calder was the
Enquirer’s editor-in-chief and worked closely with the tabloid’s owner. See Michael Pakenham,
The National Enquirer—A Shameless Insider’s Lurid Saga, BALT. SUN (June 27, 2004),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-06-27/entertainment/0406280330_1_national-enquirer-
pope-calder [http://perma.cc/6SCZ-GFMP]. Perhaps Jones theorized that Calder was a key
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3. Ambiguities in the New Test
Although the outcome in Calder seems appropriate in context,
Supreme Court opinions address more than just the equities of a
specific case. Their reasoning creates a template for courts to resolve
thousands of related cases with materially different facts. Calder’s
sparse reasoning created a veneer of clarity that masked several
unresolved questions.
All four components of Calder’s test were innovations. The Court’s
prior personal jurisdiction cases refining the minimum contacts
inquiry had not discussed “aiming,” “directing,” “calculating,”75 or
“focal points.” Prior precedent had also declined to rely on an “ef-
fects test.”76
Calder’s innovative language was imprecise in ways that have
substantial practical implications. To understand why, consider two
hypothetical variants of Calder that expose uncertainty about what
the Court meant and how lower courts should apply the test.
First, suppose that the reporters did not know that Jones lived
and worked in California. Instead, they knew that she was an ac-
tress but did not know the location of her current jobsite and resi-
dence. Would the article still have been “aimed” at California?
Probing the reporter’s knowledge exposes a fiction at the heart of
the aiming factor: the reporters aimed at a person, not a place.
There is no evidence that they cared about Jones’s nexus with Cal-
ifornia or sought a California target. They might sometimes have
cared about California contacts—their many readers in California
presumably clamored for stories about local celebrities—but a Cali-
fornia nexus may not have motivated this particular story. Jones
was an attractive target because she was famous, not necessarily
decision maker in settlement negotiations and might be more willing to support a favorable
settlement from the Enquirer if he was also personally liable for damages. If so, Jones’s multi-
year battle about jurisdiction over the employees would have been an effort to leverage
conflicts of interest against a defendant who had already acquiesced to jurisdiction.
75. A prior opinion had referred to out-of-state advertising that might have been relevant
to personal jurisdiction if it had been “reasonably calculated” to reach the forum. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
76. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978) (citation omitted).
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because she lived in California. Indeed, many celebrities live else-
where and yet remain fodder for tabloids.77
Although the Court stressed that the reporters “knowingly
cause[d] the injury in California,” the relevance of their knowledge
of Jones’s California residence was unclear.78 The reporters would
have known that Jones lived somewhere and worked somewhere
even if they did not know where. Yet they presumably still would
have libeled her. Writing the libelous story was the volitional act
connecting them to the eventual effects in California. That act
would have been equally voluntary, wrong, and harmful regardless
of whether they knew about her residence and employment in
California.
Calder is an unusual case because it involved an actress in the
film and television industry, which is widely known to be heavily
concentrated in California. The reporters might therefore have rea-
sonably anticipated injury in California even if they did not know
where Jones resided because they knew her “career was centered in
California.”79 However, one can imagine an analogous case in which
the libel victim was a prominent painter rather than an actress.
There is no language in Calder suggesting that the holding would
have been different if the Enquirer had libeled a painter who resid-
ed in and worked in California even though the national painting
community is not nearly as concentrated in the state as the film and
television industry. The local roots of the plaintiff ’s industry there-
fore do not seem to have animated Calder’s holding; what mattered
was that she lived and worked in the forum. Accordingly, it is still
interesting to consider how Calder should apply when the defendant
77. For example, one of the Enquirer’s frequent targets was New York resident Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis. See KATHLEEN TRACY, THE EVERYTHING JACQUELINE KENNEDY ONASSIS
BOOK: A PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN ICON 212 (2008) (“Whether the story was genuine and
newsworthy, superficial, or basically fiction, Jackie was the new tabloid queen.”); cf. Galella
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming injunction protecting Onassis from an
unusually persistent paparazzo).
78. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. A subsequent sentence was less precise, observing that the
defendants were “primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a
California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis.” Id. This sentence is
consistent with treating the defendants either as having aimed at the plaintiff and therefore
being subject to jurisdiction in California because that is where she lived or as having aimed
at the forum because that is where they knew she resided.
79. Id. at 788.
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does not know where the victim resides and works but is aware that
the victim must reside and work somewhere.
If the reporters’ lack of knowledge about Jones’s residence and
place of employment would have immunized them from jurisdiction,
then Calder would be far less sympathetic to plaintiffs than a natu-
ral reading would suggest. The opinion’s statement that “[a]n indiv-
idual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress
from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause
the injury in California” would not actually protect victims of
intentional misconduct.80 Instead, it would sort victims into two
categories. Victims of fastidious tortfeasors who learn their target’s
whereabouts would have a convenient remedy, while victims of ig-
norant tortfeasors who do not know where their targets reside and
work would lack a convenient remedy. It is difficult to believe that
Calder intended to sort victims this way, nor is there a compelling
reason to think that the Constitution requires such sorting.81
Calder’s aiming fiction was thus imprecise: did the reporters
“aim” at California because they aimed at Jones and that is where
she happened to be, or did they aim at California because that is
where they knew she was? This seemingly minor distinction makes
an enormous practical difference that I discuss in Part III, which
considers circumstances under which targeting the forum might not
be a prerequisite for jurisdiction.82
Second, suppose that Jones lived in Illinois and commuted to both
California and New York for work and that the reporters knew this.
Now there would be a question about whether California was the
article’s “focal point.”
Imagining a victim with multi-state contacts exposes an ambigu-
ity underlying the focal point factor. Intentional misconduct often
will not have a single focal point because victims may live, work,
and interact with multiple states. Yet it would be odd if jurisdiction
hinged on whether the defendant injured a victim whose life was
centralized in a single state rather than a victim whose relation-
80. Id.
81. For a general discussion of the constitutional issues, see sources cited supra notes 17-
18.
82. Lower courts have adopted various inconsistent tests for determining whether a
defendant aimed at the forum. See Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 704-06 (7th Cir. 2010)
(discussing circuit split).
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ships were more diffused. Identical conduct causing significant local
effects that the defendant knew would occur locally should have the
same jurisdictional consequences.83
Accordingly, Calder was unclear about whether intentional mis-
conduct always has a focal point, only sometimes has a focal point,
or may have multiple focal points. Calder was an easy case where
the victim’s relevant contacts were all with one state. But the opin-
ion provides no guidance for what it means to “aim” at or “focus” on
a victim with multi-state contacts.
The possibility that some intentional torts may not have a
geographic focal point raises a larger question: why should the
defendant’s geographic focus matter at all? If a person intentionally
commits a wrongful act that causes harm in a particular place, then
the place where the harm occurs is important ex post even if it was
not important ex ante. Yet Calder does not explain why the ex ante
focus is more salient than the ex post effects. This ambiguity has
practical implications that I discuss in Part III when considering the
relative importance of state interests and the defendant’s knowledge
and purpose.
In sum, Calder developed an innovative test for a relatively sim-
ple case. But its imprecise factors provided limited guidance to low-
er courts, resulting in widespread confusion and inconsistency.84
Thirty years later, the Court granted certiorari in Walden to clarify
Calder.
B. Walden
1. Gambling on Effects Jurisdiction
According to allegations in the Complaint that the Court assumed
to be true,85 the plaintiffs were professional gamblers who resided
83. Distinguishing two defendants who commit the same act with the same equally
foreseeable local consequences would require resting jurisdiction doctrine on a volitional local-
ization theory rather than a horizontal federalism theory. For a discussion of why the latter
is preferable, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 1.
85. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 n.2 (2014); Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558,
574 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding
personal jurisdiction.”). The First Amended Complaint is printed in the Joint Appendix. See
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in Nevada.86 After a profitable gambling excursion, they were trans-
porting approximately $97,000 in cash to Nevada through Georgia.87
Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents at At-
lanta’s airport seized the plaintiffs’ cash, purportedly because some
of it was in a bag on which a dog detected drug residue.88 Upon ar-
riving home, the plaintiffs promptly sought return of their money
and provided documentation showing that the cash was related to
legal gambling rather than illegal drug trafficking.89
Defendant Anthony Walden was a municipal police officer in
Georgia serving on the DEA task force that seized plaintiffs’ curren-
cy.90 After the seizure, he helped prepare an affidavit substantiating
probable cause.91 The affidavit included false information suggesting
a nexus with drug trafficking and omitted exculpatory information
Joint Appendix at 13-36, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574) [hereinafter Complaint]. My
description of the facts draws from the Complaint to augment the Court’s short account. Like
the Court, I assume that the plaintiffs’ allegations are true. The record also includes a short
declaration from Walden. See Joint Appendix, supra, at 39-43. All references in the footnotes
to the Complaint, Joint Appendix, or to any briefs refer to Supreme Court filings in Walden
unless otherwise noted.
86. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 2, 8. The record is not clear about when the plaintiffs
became residents of Nevada. The Supreme Court treated them as dual California/Nevada
residents at the time of the disputed events. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. The Ninth Circuit
majority hedged, noting that plaintiffs were residents of Nevada at all relevant times while
disclaiming reliance on this fact. See Fiore, 688 F.3d at 570, 580. Judge Ikuta’s dissent in the
Ninth Circuit speculated that Walden may not have known that the plaintiffs resided in
Nevada because their drivers’ licenses were issued by California. See id. at 593 (Ikuta, J.,
dissenting). Yet Walden’s carefully worded declaration does not deny knowing that plaintiffs
resided in Nevada. See Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 39-43. The Complaint does not
explicitly allege that Walden knew the plaintiffs resided in Nevada, but a court could infer
from the Complaint that Walden may have known. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 74
(alleging that Walden knew the currency originated in and was destined for Nevada); id. ¶ 79
(alleging that Walden was involved in an investigation that included searching databases
with records about the plaintiffs); id. ¶¶ 70-72 (alleging that Walden received documentation
sent by the plaintiffs from Nevada). The Supreme Court apparently did not consider the
factual dispute to be material and therefore did not decide which party should bear the con-
sequences of any uncertainty in the record about Walden’s knowledge.
87. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 11-13. The record is silent about why plaintiffs did
not use wire transfers instead of bags stuffed with cash. They apparently wanted to hide their
identities, see id. ¶¶ 10, 38, 70, which may have counseled against revealing details about
their bank accounts.
88. See id. ¶¶ 55-58.
89. See id. ¶¶ 70-71.
90. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119.
91. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 80.
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showing a nexus with gambling.92 These statements were intention-
ally false because Walden knew that the seizure was unlawful.93 An
Assistant United States Attorney eventually instructed the DEA to
return the funds, which plaintiffs received “more than six months”
after the seizure.94
Walden may have had an incentive to pursue an unjustified for-
feiture. The Complaint is generally silent about his motive.95 But
the plaintiffs’ Supreme Court brief observed that because Walden
was a member of a DEA state-federal task force, the local police de-
partment for which he worked would have received a share of the
funds that he seized.96 Commentators have suggested that revenue
sharing entices officers to be excessively aggressive when they en-
counter a large cache of currency.97
Plaintiffs filed a Bivens98 action against Walden in the District of
Nevada alleging violation of their rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment.99 Walden apparently had no material contacts with Nevada
92. See id. ¶¶ 81-83.
93. See id. ¶¶ 74, 80, 83-84.
94. Id. ¶ 95.
95. The Complaint alleged that either Walden or another agent admitted that the
currency had no connection to drugs and defended the seizure because the plaintiffs used
gambling “strategies” of which the agent “personally disapproved.” Id. ¶ 88. Neither the
Supreme Court, nor the Ninth Circuit, nor the parties’ briefs highlighted this potentially
important allegation. Presumably, the courts and parties were skittish about relying on
allegations about what Walden might have said. This concern, coupled with uncertainty about
whether Walden knew that plaintiffs resided in Nevada, see supra note 86, highlights the
importance of jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs may have had a stronger argument in the
Supreme Court if they could have shown that Walden knew they resided in Nevada and acted
out of personal distaste for one of Nevada’s principal industries.
96. See Brief for the Respondents at 2, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-
574); id. at 48 (noting that requiring property owners to litigate in the forum where assets
were seized rather than in their local forum might “embolden” officers to seize funds from
travelers who would have difficulty suing).
97. See Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 777, 786-90 (2009). The Department of Justice recently limited the ability of state law
enforcement agencies to retain seized funds, but the limit does not apply to local officers
working with federal agents on “a joint task force.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney
Gen., Prohibition on Certain Federal Adoptions of Seizures by State and Local Law Enforce-
ment Agencies (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments /2015 /01 /16 /at torney_general_order_prohibit ing_adoptions.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S72W-9XET].
98. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
99. See Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 2012). The suit challenged actions by
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other than through the conduct challenged in the suit.100 But plain-
tiffs alleged that Walden’s local contacts related to the suit were
sufficient. These included that: (1) Walden knew that some of the
currency originated in Nevada and that all of the currency was en
route to Nevada;101 (2) Walden received communication that the
plaintiffs sent from Nevada;102 and (3) injuries were experienced in
Nevada.103
On these facts, Walden is an effects case as defined in Part I. The
defendant was an outsider who acted outside the forum. He “never
traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent
anything or anyone to Nevada.”104 Yet the effects of his conduct were
experienced in the forum.105
Like Calder, Walden was a case in which the jurisdictional issue
probably had little practical significance for the defendant.106 The
United States indemnified Walden, although the record is unclear
about the extent or duration of indemnification.107 Given that the
multiple defendants in several locations, but Walden was the only defendant who was served.
See id. at 572 n.8.
100. See Declaration of Anthony Walden, in Joint Appendix, supra note 85, at 41 (stating
that he had never been present in Nevada or done business in Nevada but had once contacted
a Nevada government agency in connection with another case).
101. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 74 (“All defendants recognized at all times that the
destination of the funds at the time of the seizure was Las Vegas, Nevada, and that a
substantial amount of the currency had also originated at Las Vegas, Nevada.”); see also id.
¶¶ 45-46 (Walden met the plaintiffs at the gate for their flight to Nevada); id. ¶ 61 (a plaintiff
asked that sufficient funds be returned so that she could pay for a taxi in Nevada); id. ¶ 67
(Walden was involved in searching checked luggage destined for a flight to Nevada).
102. See id. ¶¶ 70-71.
103. See id. ¶ 111 (plaintiffs incurred attorney’s fees in Nevada in an effort to reclaim their
currency); id. ¶ 112 (plaintiffs suffered “lost use of the funds,” although this is not explicitly
alleged to have occurred in Nevada); id. ¶ 113 (plaintiffs suffered “emotional distress” upon
landing in Nevada without sufficient funds to pay for transportation).
104. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2014).
105. See supra note 103.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
107. The Department of Justice represented Walden in the District Court and Ninth Cir-
cuit; he then obtained private counsel for the petition for rehearing en banc and in the
Supreme Court. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 96, at 6-7; Brief for Petitioner at
9, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574) (mentioning that new counsel appeared
without explaining why or whether Walden paid any legal fees); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7 n.5, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-
574) (same); Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP
4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 7 n.30) (noting that the United States paid Walden’s attorney’s fees in the Supreme Court).
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Department of Justice has lawyers in Nevada and that personal ap-
pearances by litigants are rarely necessary, the marginal cost for
Walden (if indemnified) of litigating in Nevada rather than Georgia
would have been minimal.108 Nevertheless, other officers in Wal-
den’s position could face more severe burdens in distant courts.
Several amici representing the interests of law enforcement agen-
cies and officers therefore opposed jurisdiction in Nevada.109
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Nevada could
not exercise jurisdiction over Walden.110 The practical result is that
if the plaintiffs wanted to vindicate their Fourth Amendment rights,
they had to travel to Georgia, find local counsel, and litigate far
from home. Walden could not be forced to travel to Nevada even if
the federal government was managing and funding his defense. In
essence, the Court held that the Constitution allocated the burden
of distant litigation to the injured plaintiffs rather than to the defen-
dant who allegedly caused their injuries.
2. The Holding Hinges on the Court’s Distinction Between
Contacts with the Forum and Contacts with Forum Residents
The Court explained that Walden’s “actions in Georgia did not
create sufficient contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly
The United States does not appear to have denied indemnifying Walden throughout the case
and referred to him as a “federal agent[ ]” in a paragraph of its Supreme Court brief noting
that federal agents are routinely indemnified. Brief for the United States, supra, at 6. But cf.
id. at 19-20 (noting that indemnification is “discretionary” and that Walden was represented
by private counsel, but not explicitly stating that indemnification had been revoked); id. at
21 (referring to Walden’s “potential access to ... indemnification for any adverse judgment”).
The Attorney General has discretion to determine when indemnification is appropriate and
may pay for a private attorney to represent officers. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (2015).
108. The District Court could have protected Walden by requiring that his deposition occur
in Georgia. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (court may grant protective order specifying “place”
for discovery); Farquhar v. Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (noting  presumption
in favor of deposing non-resident defendants in their home states). In addition, personal ap-
pearances are often unnecessary at hearings. See Talent Tree, Inc. v. Madlock, No. 4:07-cv-
03735, 2008 WL 8082752, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2008) (exercising personal jurisdiction and
noting that “given modern communications, many interactions with the Court, including
hearings, can be conducted electronically or by telephone”).
109. See Brief for Fed. Law Enforcement Officers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 8-17, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574); Brief of Alabama et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11-17, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574).
110. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119.
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directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada con-
nections.”111 This reasoning hinges on a distinction between the
forum and its residents. Walden had contacts with people from Nev-
ada, but in the Court’s view that was not equivalent to establishing
contacts with “Nevada itself.”112 Thus, “[t]he proper question is not
where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but
whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a
meaningful way.”113 Here, contacts with Nevada were not “meaning-
ful” because Walden did not “create” them.114 He created contacts
with Georgia that plaintiffs tried to extend into Nevada when they
“chose” to live there.115
The short opinion manages to invoke the forum/resident distinc-
tion twenty-seven times.116 The opinion stressed the need for con-
tacts “with the forum State” eight times; “with Nevada” seven times;
“with the forum” three times; “with California” twice; and “with the
State” and “with a particular State” once each.117 Similarly, the
opinion noted the insufficiency of contacts “with the plaintiff” twice;
and “with persons who reside” in the forum, “with respondents,” and
111. Id. at 1125.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1125-26.
115. Id. at 1125. Earlier cases had relied on a less rigid version of the forum/resident dis-
tinction. One noted the importance of “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Another came close to Walden by
distinguishing “constitutionally cognizable contact with” the forum from contact with a person
whose “unilateral activity” led to entanglement with the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980) (citation omitted). But in Volkswagen, the
defendants never interacted with a forum resident and had no reason to believe that their
conduct had any connection to the forum. See id. at 288 (noting that the case arose from the
sale of a car in New York to a New York resident who later drove through the forum).
Another decision had noted that “contact with the forum state” was synonymous with “some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). That formulation is not appropriate in effects cases involv-
ing intentional torts. For example, a terrorist whose intentionally targeted acts outside the
forum kill people inside the forum is not seeking the “benefits and protections” of forum law
and yet should be subject to jurisdiction under Calder. See infra Part III.B. The mismatch
presumably explains why Calder never cites Hanson or the “purposeful availment” test.
Walden likewise never mentions purposeful availment.
116. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119-26.
117. Id.
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“with other persons affiliated with the State” once each.118 Seven of
these references appear on a single page.119
The Court apparently was preoccupied with confirming that de-
fendants must have minimum contacts with the forum rather than
with the forum’s residents. As I explain in Part III.A, however, the
forum/resident distinction is a meaningless formality that obscures
difficult questions about the scope of state power.
3. Reframing Calder
The holdings in Walden and Calder are consistent, yet Walden ne-
vertheless provided a revisionist account of Calder’s reasoning. That
account has already caused mischief in lower courts.
Jurisdiction would have been appropriate over Walden under two
of the four Calder factors. His false affidavit was “calculated to
cause injury,” and its “effects” were experienced in the forum.120 The
“aiming” factor is more ambiguous. The reporters in Calder and
officer in Walden knew that the plaintiffs had a connection to the
forum state. But the reporters’ knowledge was more robust. They
knew that they were writing about an actress who lived and worked
in California and whose reputation could be devastated by allega-
tions of binge drinking while performing.121 In contrast, Walden
knew that he was dealing with gamblers who were moving between
various gambling destinations, including Nevada.122 He did not
necessarily know that the plaintiffs resided in Nevada.123 The “aim-
ing” factor is sufficiently malleable to either justify or foreclose
jurisdiction in Walden.124 But clarifying the aiming inquiry was un-
necessary in Walden because of the fourth Calder factor.
Walden’s rejection of jurisdiction is consistent with Calder’s en-
dorsement of jurisdiction because Nevada was not the “focal point”
118. Id. at 1122-24.
119. See id. at 1123.
120. See supra Part II.B.1.
121. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 785, 789-90 (1984).
122. The plaintiffs were returning from a trip to several casinos and informed Walden
about their journey. See Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 11, 50.
123. See supra note 86.
124. See supra Part II.A.2.
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of the defendant’s conduct.125 He encountered the plaintiffs in Geor-
gia, seized their money in Georgia, wrote an affidavit in Georgia,
and interacted with the United States Attorney’s office in Georgia.126
Walden’s gaze never left Georgia, so Calder did not support juris-
diction in Nevada.
More generally, the factual predicate for effects-based jurisdiction
in Walden was much weaker than in Calder. The following table
uses facts drawn from the two opinions to illustrate the relationship
between the cases.127 The table suggests that Walden was a poor ve-
hicle for revisiting personal jurisdiction in effects cases. While the
defendant caused harm in Nevada, his connection to Nevada was
tenuous. An opinion rejecting jurisdiction in Walden therefore would
likely be (and turned out to be) unhelpful for resolving harder cases.
The opinion sends a signal about easier cases, but even that signal
is muddled because of imprecision that I discuss in Part III.
125. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
126. See supra Part II.B.1.
127. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119-20 (2014); Calder, 465 U.S. at 785, 787-89.








In the forum. Outside the forum.
Severity of local
injury
Long-term damage to a
celebrity’s reputation within
the state in which she worked.
Temporary deprivation of funds






plaintiff ’s reputation each
time someone read it.
Defendant was one of multiple
agents who contributed to an
affidavit that may have
prolonged an investigation that




Defendants chose to write
about a forum resident and
contacted sources in the
forum.
Defendant worked at a large
airport where he routinely
encountered travelers and did
not alter his activities based on




published in the forum and
one of the defendants called
sources in the forum.
Defendant received data from
the forum but did not send




Defendants knew that the
conduct would affect a forum
resident.
Defendant was aware that




Article discussed activities in
the forum by a forum resident
as recounted by sources in the
forum and was included in a
newspaper distributed in the
forum.
Defendant seized cash that he
found outside the forum and
then submitted an affidavit to
an official outside the forum.
Effects jurisprudence would be clearer if the Court had denied
Walden’s petition for certiorari. However, the Ninth Circuit may
have forced the Court’s hand by upholding jurisdiction over eight
dissenting votes in a case that raised substantial concerns for many
states and law enforcement officers.128
Despite the fact that Calder’s holding was easily distinguishable,
the Court decided to recharacterize Calder’s reasoning. According
128. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see also Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 562
(9th Cir. 2012) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 568
(McKeown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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to Walden, “[t]he crux of Calder” rested on the metaphysics of libel
law.129 Libel arises from publication, publication occurred in Califor-
nia, and thus the “tort actually occurred in California.”130 Publica-
tion of the story therefore connected the Florida defendants “to Cali-
fornia” rather than only to the plaintiff.131
Walden’s reading of Calder was strained and revisionist. Calder
did not discuss the nuances of libel law and did not consider where
the tort occurred.132 Tellingly, the paragraph in Walden purporting
to explain what Calder meant never cites Calder.133 Walden thus
tried to transform the Calder test from a functional, practical as-
sessment of the reporters’ conduct into a formal corollary to “the
nature of the libel tort.”134
Fortunately, the Court in Walden hedged on its reimagining of
Calder. Whether due to lack of votes or lack of resolve, the Court
stated that Calder was only “largely” about libel law.135 Walden also
reiterated Calder’s “focal point” test.136 This hedge leaves room for
courts to continue citing Calder even outside the libel context. At
least one court has done so, holding that “Walden and Calder do not
limit ‘suit related conduct’ to the elements of a tort.”137
Unfortunately, several courts have not parsed Walden as care-
fully and have read Walden to foreclose nuanced analysis of Calder
outside the libel context.138 The extent to which Walden displaces
129. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
130. See id. at 1124 (emphasis in original).
131. Id.
132. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-91.
133. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123-24.
134. Id. at 1124.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1123 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789).
137. Havel v. Honda Motor Eur. Ltd., No. H-13-1291, 2014 WL 4967229, at *10 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 30, 2014) (emphasizing that additional factors were relevant in Calder beside the
elements of libel law); cf. Leibman v. Prupes, No. 2:14-cv-09003-CAS(VBKx), 2015 WL 898454,
at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (finding personal jurisdiction under Calder in a non-libel case
and stating that “the Supreme Court decided Walden narrowly on the facts before it”).
138. See Skyworks Sols., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs. HK Ltd., No. 13-10655-Gao, 2015 WL
461920, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2015) (citing Walden’s “libel tort” language while noting that
“the Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of Calder’s particular facts to its
outcome”); Bank of Am. v. Corporex Cos., No. 3:13-CV-691-RJC, 2014 WL 3731778, at *4
(W.D.N.C. July 28, 2014) (distinguishing Calder because Walden “recognized that the finding
of personal jurisdiction turned, in large measure, on the unique nature of the libel tort”);
Conex Energy—Can., LLC v. Mann Eng’g, Ltd., No. CIV 13-4123-KES, 2014 WL 3732571, at
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Calder as the source of standards for effects cases is therefore un-
settled. That confusion is a problem because terrorism, computer
hacking, and myriad other forms of intentional torts lack the
idiosyncratic nuances of libel law. Part III considers how effects
jurisdiction might still exist in those cases.
4. Maneuvering Room in Walden’s Reasoning
Walden’s unanimity and brevity belie disagreement among the
Justices. That disagreement runs deeper than merely hedging about
the recharacterization of Calder.139
The best evidence of latent tension lies in what is missing from
the opinion: Walden never mentions the Court’s decision about per-
sonal jurisdiction in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, decided
three years earlier.140 Nicastro is not a pure effects case because it
involved distribution of commercial products.141 However, Nicastro
is relevant because it considered whether an injury in the forum
justified personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose conduct had
occurred outside the forum.142 Both parties in Walden cited Nicastro
extensively in their briefs.143 Nevertheless, Walden ignored the
Court’s most recent relevant decision.
Nicastro is an unattractive precedent because the Court could not
agree on answers to foundational questions about why the Consti-
tution limits personal jurisdiction or how judges should balance
competing state and private interests.144 A four-Justice plurality
*7 (D.S.D. July 25, 2014) (distinguishing Calder because libel was not analogous to the torts
of “conspiracy and interference with a business relationship” at issue); Private Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. Dareus, No. 2:13-CV-18 TS, 2014 WL 3394662, at *5 (D. Utah July 10, 2014) (noting
that Walden’s references to the “libel tort” “clarif[ied] the applicability of the Calder test”).
139. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
140. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion).
141. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
142. The defendant in Nicastro manufactured a product in England that harmed the plain-
tiff in New Jersey. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
143. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 107, at 11, 13, 18-19, 26, 32, 34; Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 96, at 23-25, 32, 38, 48.
144. For a discussion of the competing positions in Nicastro, see Adam N. Steinman, The
Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
63 S.C. L. REV. 481 (2012).
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disagreed with three dissenting Justices,145 while two concurring
Justices found neither alternative convincing.146
Evidently, the factions in Nicastro wanted to avoid revisiting con-
tentious questions. Walden thus states that “[w]ell-established prin-
ciples of personal jurisdiction are sufficient to decide this case.”147
The apparent price of unanimity in Walden was a need to avoid
generalizing the holding beyond the oft-repeated forum/resident
distinction.148 Key paragraphs of analysis end with fact-bound asser-
tions that particular contacts were not “meaningful,” “jurisdiction-
ally relevant,” or a “proper basis for jurisdiction.”149 These opaque
statements resolved the case but provide little guidance to courts
confronting effects jurisdiction in future cases with distinct facts.
The issues that I identify in Part III may therefore provide a foun-
dation for distinguishing Walden and minimizing its footprint.
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE EFFECTS TEST FOR FUTURE CASES
Walden’s unanimity and dismissive rhetoric create an illusion of
clarity. This Part dispels that illusion. Section A shows that Walden
relies on an unsustainable distinction between a forum and its resi-
dents. To remedy this problem, Section A proposes a practical ap-
proach to reading and applying Walden that is consistent with the
holding and provides a more sensible context for its reasoning.
Section B then explores several questions that Walden and Calder
leave open and suggests factors that can guide the effects inquiry in
future cases.
145. Compare Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785-91 (plurality opinion), with id. at 2794-804
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 2791-94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
147. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014).
148. Cf. Donald R. Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opin-
ions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 225, 226 (1982) (“[S]everal
studies have provided compelling evidence that conflict over the outcome of the cases is
sometimes hidden under the veneer of officially unanimous opinions.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995) (“Participants in
legal controversies try to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes.
They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it.”) (footnote
omitted).
149. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124-25.
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A. Reframing the Aiming Inquiry by Refining the Forum/Resident
Distinction
Walden’s holding is built on a single thin premise: a defendant’s
contacts “with the forum State itself” are distinct from its contacts
“with persons who reside there.”150 Courts have already struggled to
implement this distinction with dubious results.151
Distinguishing contacts with the forum from contacts with its res-
idents is misguided for two reasons. First, the forum/resident dis-
tinction resuscitates the stilted formality that the Court previously
tried to expel from personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Second, the
forum/resident distinction ignores the reality of how most inten-
tional torts occur and obscures the need for a more subtle account
of how state power and individual rights intersect when an outsider
causes harm in the forum. The distinction is therefore misleading
unless it is reframed to focus on more meaningful contacts, such as
the nexus between the outsider’s conduct and the state’s laws. Sec-
tion 1 identifies the distinction’s imprecision and formality, Section
2 discusses how the distinction distracts from more relevant in-
quiries, and Section 3 considers how to reframe the distinction in a
way that might provide more appropriate guidance.
150. Id. at 1122; see also supra Part II.B.2.
151. See, e.g., Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the defen-
dant’s alleged intentional interference with a thirty-five million dollar contract executed in
the forum by the local plaintiff who the defendant threatened “to destroy” was insufficient to
warrant jurisdiction because the plaintiff ’s injury was “not tethered to California” and was
“entirely personal to him and would follow him wherever he might choose to live or travel”);
Free Conferencing Corp. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-07113-ODW(SHx), 2014 WL
7404600, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2014) (holding that “harm to non-parties” in the forum “is
utterly irrelevant” to jurisdiction, even though the defendant’s conduct directed at the local
plaintiff had the anticipated effect of preventing local consumers from using the plaintiff ’s
service); Parlant Tech. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:12-cv-417-BCW, 2014 WL 4851881, at *6-7 (D.
Utah Sept. 29, 2014) (rejecting personal jurisdiction because even if the defendant
intentionally infringed the trademark of a company that it knew to be based in the forum, it
did not target “the State” despite voluntarily starting a “pilot-project” with the plaintiff that
involved the trademark); Bank of Am. v. Corporex Cos., No. 3:13-CV-691-RJC, 2014 WL
3731778, at *1, *4-5 (W.D.N.C. July 28, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs had no contact with “the
state” despite fraudulently hiding assets from the local plaintiff to whom they allegedly owed
thirty million dollars).
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1. The Forum/Resident Distinction Is Imprecise and Needlessly
Formal
The basic error in Walden is that the Court did not consider what
a “State” is and thus had no sense of how “contacts” with “the forum
State” occur. States are both physical and legal entities. They are
places with territory and borders, as well as governments with insti-
tutions, officers, and laws.152 As such, Walden’s requirement of “con-
tacts” with a “State” could have two very different meanings: contact
with the state’s territory or contact with a manifestation of the state
government. Neither meaning is sensible and both rely on discred-
ited formal approaches to jurisdiction.
a. The Court Did Not Require Contacts with State Territory
Walden’s holding could not have rested on a need for contacts
with the forum state’s territory. Loose language in the opinion
suggests the need for physical contact because the Court stressed
that the libel in Calder occurred “in” California, where the article
was published.153 In contrast, the Court implied that because
Walden was not a libel action, there was no similar territorial nexus
between the defendant’s conduct and the forum.154
Conditioning personal jurisdiction on where a tort occurs is point-
less because injury is an element of every intentional tort.155 Effects
cases by definition link personal jurisdiction to a local injury.156 So
in every effects case, including Walden, some portion of the alleged
tort occurs within the forum’s territory, and thus there is a physical
152. For a discussion of how government entities have a physical and legal dimension, see
Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1171-72 (2011).
153. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
154. See id. at 1123-24; supra Part II.B.3.
155. See Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]njury is an essen-
tial element of every tort.”).
156. See supra Part I. If the defendant caused an injury in the forum distinct from the
injury underlying the plaintiff ’s tort suit, specific jurisdiction in an effects case would not be
available absent extremely unusual circumstances. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct.
746, 754 (2014) (holding that “specific jurisdiction” requires that “the suit ‘aris[es] out of or
relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum’” (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (alterations in original))).
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contact with the forum.157 That contact might be insufficient for
jurisdiction when viewed in the context of other factors, but it is still
contact. Yet Walden held that the defendant had “no jurisdictionally
relevant contacts with Nevada.”158 The Court therefore could not
have been defining “contacts” in the sense of the defendant’s action
causing something to happen within the forum’s territory.159
Another possibility is that Walden was envisioning territorial con-
tacts, but the contacts needed to be more direct than simply causing
an effect within the forum. On this view, Officer Walden might have
had contacts with Nevada if he had “sent” something there,160 al-
though he would not have needed to enter the forum himself.161
A need for direct interaction with territory could not have been
the rationale for the Court’s “contacts” theory for three reasons.
First, one of the defendants in Calder (the editor) never sent any-
thing to California and was still subject to its jurisdiction.162 Walden
did not purport to overrule Calder and therefore could not have held
that sending something into the forum’s territory is a prerequisite
for jurisdiction. Second, Walden noted that “physical entry into the
State,” including by “mail,” is merely “a relevant contact,” implying
that it is not always required.163 Third, there is no plausible argu-
ment that the unanimous Court in Walden would have altered its
holding if the officer had sent a single one-line email to Nevada
asking the plaintiffs for information. Yet the email would have been
a “contact with the forum.”164 Accordingly, the Court’s repeated
reliance on Walden’s lack of sufficient contacts with Nevada must
157. In Walden, the local injuries were a temporary deprivation of funds, payment of attor-
ney’s fees, and emotional distress. See supra note 103. A more difficult problem would arise
if a plaintiff injured entirely outside the forum seeks to base jurisdiction on injuries to third
parties within the forum, such that there would be local effects but not necessarily a local tort.
158. Walden, 134 U.S. at 1124.
159. Id.
160. Id. (stressing that Walden “never ... sent anything or anyone to Nevada”); see also id.
at 1122 (“[P]hysical entry into the State ... through an agent, goods, mail, or some other
means—is certainly a relevant contact.”).
161. See id. (“[P]hysical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction.”).
162. The editor made no calls to California and the Court did not deem him responsible for
his employer’s decision to distribute the magazine in California. See supra notes 59, 63 and
accompanying text.
163. See Walden, 134 U.S. at 1122.
164. Id. at 1125.
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have focused on something other than the lack of direct interaction
with Nevada’s territory.
b. The Court Might Have Required Contacts with States as
Incorporeal Entities, but Such a Requirement Would Be
Incoherent
If Walden did not focus on contacts with the forum’s territory,
then it must have focused on contacts with the forum as a govern-
ment entity. Yet legal entities have no corporeal existence aside
from their territory, so there is nothing else to contact directly.
States as entities exist through their institutions, agents, and laws.
These manifestations of the state in turn define interests that the
state seeks to protect, such as the well-being of its residents and
markets.165
If Walden meant to require contact with a state as a legal entity,
then the Court’s distinction between contacts with a state and with
its residents is incoherent. There was no way for Walden to have
contacts with the entity “Nevada” other than by interacting with a
manifestation of Nevada’s existence, such as an institution or
resident.166 Walden had such an interaction when he deprived Neva-
da residents of Nevada-based property. Deeming Walden to have no
contacts “with Nevada” despite his contacts with local residents and
property ignores Nevada’s incorporeal attributes.167 Having ignored
these incorporeal facets of Nevada’s existence, the Court failed to
explain what contact “with the State” could mean.
Walden’s contacts with manifestations of Nevada do not necessar-
ily mean that jurisdiction was appropriate. Residents of different
states routinely interact without subjecting themselves to jurisdic-
tion in each other’s domiciles. The difference between interactions
165. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (upholding per-
sonal jurisdiction and noting that the forum had “a significant interest in redressing injuries
that actually occur within the State”); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
(upholding personal jurisdiction and noting that the forum had “a manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims”).
166. Walden might also have developed contacts with Nevada’s laws. I discuss this possi-
bility in Part III.A.3.
167. Of course, Nevada also has territory, but the prior Section explained why the Court
could not have relied on the defendant’s lack of contact with Nevada’s territory.
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that create jurisdiction and interactions that do not hinges on the
nature and consequences of the activity. Courts should not evade
this complex inquiry by searching for ethereal contacts with the
state “itself.”168
c. Whether the Forum/Resident Distinction Requires Contact
with Territory or an Entity, It Needlessly Revives Archaic
Formal Approaches to Jurisdiction that the Court
Repudiated in International Shoe
Interpreting Walden to require direct contacts between the defen-
dant and the forum “itself” would revive archaic theories that the
Court rejected seventy years ago. The modern history of personal
jurisdiction doctrine, in a nutshell, has three phases. First, the
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff held that a state could exercise juris-
diction only over defendants who were present “within its territory”
at the time of service.169 Second, courts relaxed the “presence”
requirement by allowing jurisdiction based on “fictions” such as
“constructive presence” in the forum at the time of wrongdoing.170
The idea was that even an incorporeal defendant, such as a corpor-
ation, could be present based on activities it caused to occur within
the forum. As Judge Learned Hand explained, “[w]hen we say ...
that a corporation may be sued only where it is ‘present,’ we under-
stand that the word is used, not literally, but as shorthand for
something else.”171 Third, the Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington172 “abandoned” the “presence” test in favor of focusing
on the defendant’s “contacts” with the forum.173 Jurisdiction became
168. Cf. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980) (declining to base personal jurisdiction
on an “ingenious ... legal fiction”).
169. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). Pennoyer included an exception for suits regarding “civil sta-
tus” under state law. Id. at 734-35 (discussing marriage and divorce). Presence in the state
is no longer necessary for jurisdiction, but may still be sufficient. See Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of how doctrine evolved
before Pennoyer, see Weinstein, supra note 17, at 175-204.
170. Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2192 (1997).
171. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
172. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
173. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (describing International Shoe)
(citation omitted).
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appropriate when the defendant had “sufficient contacts or ties with
the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to
permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has in-
curred there.”174
International Shoe’s analysis was transformative.175 Yet courts
confronting unsettling new problems often overlook Shoe’s in-
sights.176 International Shoe considered a state’s effort to tax an
out-of-state corporation’s local employees. The corporation disputed
jurisdiction because it had carefully structured its operations to
minimize its local presence: employees solicited orders in the state,
but contracts were accepted and fulfilled outside the state.177 These
facts presented an opportunity for the Court to refine the presence
inquiry.178 Instead, the Court realized that the presence inquiry was
misguided because deeming an incorporeal defendant “present”
“beg[s] the question to be decided,”—whether its “activities” were
“sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”179
174. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. The Court’s reformulation loosely mirrors the Restatement
of Judgments released three years earlier, which stated: “The fundamental requirement as
to the jurisdiction of a State over a person is that there should be such a relation between the
State and the person that it is reasonable for the State to exercise control over him through
its courts.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
175. One commentator analogized International Shoe to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938), observing that both “served rather to destroy existent doctrine than to
establish new criteria for the Supreme Court and other courts to follow.” Philip B. Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 586 (1958).
176. Fictions are difficult to resist, especially when courts confront new technologies that
do not fit easily into existing doctrinal categories. Suits arising from Internet activity have
been fertile sources of formalism and fictions in jurisdictional analysis. See Danielle Keats
Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol and the Coming
Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1535-38 (2006) (dis-
cussing how “constructive presence” animates jurisdictional analysis in many Internet cases);
Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens
of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 431 (2004) (criticizing “jurisdictional fiction”
in cases involving Internet activity). For another example of fictions seeping into modern
personal jurisdiction, see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2799 n.5 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality for reviving the “long discredited fiction of
implied consent”).
177. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314.
178. See id. at 315 (noting that the defendant’s appellate argument relied on its lack of
“presence” in the forum).
179. Id. at 316-17.
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In essence, International Shoe held that the “presence” label mas-
querades as a factual conclusion about the defendant’s conduct but
is really a policy conclusion about the state’s power. Chief Justice
Stone’s analysis reflects his extensive exposure to and partial
embrace of legal realism.180 Power was the central issue, so the
presence inquiry was a distraction. The answer to the question “was
the defendant present in the state” had no significance independent
from the legal context in which the question was asked. Once the
legal context was clear, broader context-specific values eclipsed the
notion of presence.
Chief Justice Stone had made the same point in an earlier case
about due process constraints on a state’s taxing power. In Curry v.
McCanless, the Court held that the potential “presence” of intangi-
ble property within a state could not determine whether the state
could tax it.181 Curry and International Shoe address two sides of the
same coin: a state’s authority to impose a tax and its authority to
provide a forum for enforcing a tax.182
A fascinating aspect of International Shoe is that it replicates
Curry’s analysis without ever citing Curry. Neither courts nor com-
mentators have analyzed similarities between the two cases.183
180. See George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 347, 354-58 (documenting Stone’s contacts with prominent legal realists dating
back to his time as Dean of Columbia Law School); id. at 358 (characterizing International
Shoe as a “synthesis” of past precedent and “selective sympathy” with legal realism); Logan
Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological Jurispru-
dence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 82-86 (2001) (discussing
how Shoe’s analysis parallels contemporary criticism of formal reasoning, especially in the
“sociological jurisprudence” literature).
181. 307 U.S. 357, 366 (1939).
182. Just as International Shoe borrowed from a case about extraterritorial taxation, a case
about extraterritorial taxation subsequently borrowed from International Shoe. See Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1992) (incorporating International Shoe’s
“minimum contacts” test). The Court still struggles to distinguish due process constraints on
a state’s taxing authority from limits imposed by other provisions of the Constitution. See
Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1799 (2015) (holding in a 5-4 decision that “the fact
that a State has the jurisdictional power to impose a tax says nothing about whether that tax
violates the Commerce Clause”).
183. Both cases involved efforts by states to collect taxes and are occasionally cited in tax
scholarship but without a comparative analysis. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Juris-
diction and the Mythical “Physical Presence” Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105, 107
n.11, 114 (2000).
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Defendant’s argument hinged on
whether “its activities within the state
were ... sufficient to manifest its
‘presence’ there.”
Defendant’s argument hinged on “the situs
or location to be attributed to the
intangibles.”
“Since the corporate personality is a
fiction ... its ‘presence’ without ... the
state of its origin can be manifested
only by activities carried on in its
behalf.”
Noted “the impossibility of attributing a
single location to that which has no
physical characteristics.”
“[S]ome of the decisions ... have been
supported by resort to the legal fiction
that [the defendant] has given its
consent to service and suit .... But more
realistically it may be said that those
authorized acts were of such a nature
as to justify the fiction.”
“While fictions are sometimes invented in
order to realize the judicial conception of
justice, we cannot define the constitutional
guaranty in terms of a fiction so unrelated
to reality.”
Rejecting need to “symbolize” the
defendant’s activity with “terms” like
“present” or “presence.”
Rejecting need for a “fictitious situs.”
State power depends on whether the
defendant “exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state,
[such that] it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise
to obligations.”
State power depends on whether the
defendant “extends his activities with
respect to his intangibles, so as to avail
himself of the protection and benefit of the
laws ... in such a way as to bring his person
or property within the [state’s] reach.”
“[T]he criteria by which we mark the
boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do
not, cannot be simply mechanical.”
“We find it impossible to say that taxation
of intangibles can be reduced in every case
to the mere mechanical operation of
locating at a single place, and there taxing,
every legal interest growing out of all the
complex legal relationships which may be
entered into between persons.”
The close connection between Curry and International Shoe high-
lights how personal jurisdiction doctrine should not be perceived as
an idiosyncratic field at the margins of constitutional law. Interna-
tional Shoe did not attempt to create a unique doctrine to address
184. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315-19; Curry, 307 U.S. at 356-74.
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the seemingly technical problem of adjudicative jurisdiction.
Instead, the opinion cloaked personal jurisdiction in broader princi-
ples of constitutional law and legal reasoning. The Court recognized
that adjudicative jurisdiction to enforce taxes, like prescriptive juris-
diction to impose taxes, is one of many interrelated problems that
arise from the allocation of power between fifty coequal states.
Analyzing these connections can lead to a more nuanced under-
standing of how personal jurisdiction doctrine should operate.185
Curry also illustrates that Chief Justice Stone’s critique of
substituting categorical fictions for nuanced analysis was not merely
a reaction to Pennoyer. Instead, International Shoe’s departure from
the constructive presence test reflected a deep suspicion of analyti-
cal shortcuts, including the shortcut that animates Walden.186
Reading Walden to focus on direct contacts with the forum “itself”
would revive the discredited constructive presence test. Instead of
asking whether the defendant acted in a way that justified the as-
sertion of state power, the Court would be looking for a shortcut—
such as something sent to the forum, an idiosyncratic quirk of the
governing tort law, or a basis for treating an ethereal “state” as a
concrete entity.187 International Shoe rejected such “mechanical”
inquiries in favor of a more nuanced assessment of the “quality and
nature of the [defendant’s] activity.”188 Walden purported to rely on
185. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing potential connections between limits on adjudicative
and prescriptive jurisdiction); see also Clyde Spillinger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality,
and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 1240, 1246 (2015) (noting the “common jurisprudential position” underlying Chief
Justice Stone’s decisions addressing personal jurisdiction and choice of law).
186. Justice Stone’s opinion in Curry echoed an earlier opinion in which he observed that:
The rule that property is subject to taxation at its situs, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the taxing state, readily understood and applied with respect to
tangibles, is in itself meaningless when applied to intangibles which, since they
are without physical characteristics, can have no location in space. The resort
to a fiction by the attribution of a tax situs to an intangible is only a means of
symbolizing, without fully revealing, those considerations which are persuasive
grounds for deciding that a particular place is appropriate for the imposition of
the tax.
First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1937) (citation omitted). These
three cases (International Shoe, Curry, and First Bank) are consistent with Stone’s broader
tendency to “push[ ] aside question-begging reifications.” Herbert Wechsler, Stone and the
Constitution, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 764, 784 (1946).
187. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Walden’s attempt to distinguish Calder).
188. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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“[w]ell-established principles of personal jurisdiction,” which coun-
sels against reading Walden to resuscitate fictions that Internation-
al Shoe interred.189
A judicial opinion that invokes the categorical forum/resident
distinction twenty-seven times—as does Walden190—protests too
much. The distinction was apparently a convenient way of resolving
the case without revisiting Nicastro’s theoretical schism.191 That
shortcut did no damage in Walden because the case was relatively
easy: Walden was a local police officer acting locally who had at
most a tenuous connection to Nevada (especially when compared to
the defendants’ contacts in Calder).192 But courts confronting harder
cases will need to look past stifling formal distinctions to the func-
tional analysis in International Shoe.193
2. Two Hypothetical Examples Illustrate How the
Forum/Resident Distinction’s Emphasis on Motives
Obscures the Importance of State Regulatory Interests in
Justifying the Exercise of State Power
The formality of the forum/resident distinction leads courts to
focus on irrelevant questions at the expense of salient inquiries. For
189. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014).
190. See supra Part II.B.2.
191. See supra Part II.B.4. Nicastro itself relied on a Pennoyer-esque categorical approach
to constitutional analysis that allowed the plurality to decouple the forum’s power from its
interests. See Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism in
Federalism: Shady Grove versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 916 (2012); Charles
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First
Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 433-34 (2012); cf. Sawyer, supra note 180, at 65-66
(explaining how Justice Field employed contemporary tools of “formal jurisprudence” to con-
struct the Pennoyer rule).
192. See supra Part II.B.3.
193. See supra Part III.A.1. My critique of formalism here is limited. I do not contend that
the “very idea of decisionmaking by rule” is inappropriate. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (identifying common themes in critiques of formalism). Instead, I
contend that Walden was preoccupied with the “specific linguistic formulation of a rule”
despite that rule’s imprecision and disconnection from the values underlying the constitu-
tional provision that the rule purports to enforce. Id. Walden’s formalism was flawed not
because all formalism is necessarily flawed, but rather because it was poorly implemented
and a poor fit for the problem the Court was trying to address. However, in fairness to the
Court, Walden is not the first decision to struggle with translating International Shoe’s “open-
ended” language into manageable rules. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 180, at 358.
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example, Walden and Calder both require assessing whether the
defendant directed conduct toward the forum.194 Yet geographic aim-
ing is not a helpful concept in intentional tort cases.
Intentional torts generally target entities rather than places. For
example, libelous articles target their subjects, letter bombs target
their recipients, and computer viruses target the users of infected
systems. Tortfeasors often know where their victims reside, but
there is usually little reason to think that geographic knowledge mo-
tivates the tort. Injuries occur in a particular state not because the
wrongdoer targeted the state but because victims have to be
somewhere, and that is where they happened to be. Terrorism is an
exception, as terrorists often have political goals that make the
place of injury more important than the identity of specific vic-
tims.195 Exceptions may also arise in commercial cases if actors
seeking to profit from one market intentionally externalize the costs
of their operations onto another.196 
The potential difference in motives between terrorists and other
tortfeasors highlights an oddity of Walden’s forum/resident distinc-
tion. Although the distinction implies that motives matter, there are
good reasons to think that motives can be irrelevant. The following
hypothetical scenario illustrates the problem.
194. See supra Part II.
195. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defense-university [http://perma.cc/YZ8Y-YP6Y] (“[T]he terrorism we face
is fueled by a common ideology—a belief by some extremists that ... violence against Western
targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause.”); Memorandum from John
C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities
Within the United States 3 (Oct. 23, 2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20011023.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTP3-GAE3] (analogizing a recent “pattern of
terrorist activity ... directed primarily against the United States Government, its military and
diplomatic personnel and its citizens” to “war”).
196. For example, a defendant seeking to curry favor with the officials of a state in which
it operates might structure its activities to shift pollution to a neighboring state in which it
does no business, especially if it can operate near another state’s border. These externalities
might justify jurisdiction in the state that bears costs and is the target of the defendant’s
conduct. But see Klerman, supra note 20, at 272 (rejecting jurisdiction in this scenario due to
the risk that the forum’s courts would be biased against an outsider who does not confer any
benefits on the forum). The added complexity associated with commercial activity explains
why I exclude commercial distribution cases from my model of effects jurisdiction. See supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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Imagine two hypothetical suits in Nevada arising from successive
attacks by two different hackers in Georgia. Both attacks targeted
and crippled computer servers located at Acme Airlines’ headquar-
ters in Georgia. Each attack caused Acme to ground its flights
nationwide, leading to chaos at its Las Vegas hub and a substantial
loss of tourism revenue in Nevada. Each hacker fully anticipated
these effects. After each attack, the hacker published a manifesto.
The first hacker said: “I launched this attack to cripple Acme Air-
lines because I despise the Acme Corporation.” The second hacker
said: “I launched this attack to prevent people from travelling to Las
Vegas, which is a hotbed of sin that I despise.” According to Walden,
jurisdiction would be appropriate in the second case because the
hacker targeted “the forum State itself.”197 But a literal reading of
Walden suggests that jurisdiction would not be proper in the first
case. The first hacker targeted property in Georgia belonging to a
Georgia-based entity that happened to be doing business in
Nevada—the forum is merely where the victim “chose to be.”198
There is no meaningful distinction between the two hypothet-
ical hackers that would justify jurisdiction over only one. Both
interacted with servers in Georgia, never set foot in Nevada, never
sent anything to Nevada, and had no political affiliation with Neva-
da. But both knowingly committed a wrongful act, aimed that act at
the defendant, knew that harm would occur where the defendant
operated, and knew that the defendant operated in Nevada. Acme’s
interests in litigating in Nevada are the same in both cases, as are
Nevada’s interests in providing a forum based on events in the
state.199 The burden of litigating in Nevada would also be the same
in both cases.
The Court has not articulated a plausible theory to justify making
the hackers’ distinct motives dispositive. One might contend that
the hacker with an animus toward Las Vegas should “reasonably
anticipate” jurisdiction in Nevada, while the hacker who merely
197. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014).
198. Id. at 1125.
199. In theory, Acme’s and Nevada’s interests might be slightly stronger in the case where
Las Vegas was the hacker’s target. The victim and forum may want to send a signal about
their resolve to resist targeted attacks and local adjudication might be cathartic for victims.
But the absence of such political signaling does not warrant precluding jurisdiction in the first
hypothetical if the plaintiff and forum still have legitimate interests.
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hated Acme should not.200 But the anticipation test is circular. Juris-
diction is equally predictable in both cases. Deeming one prediction
reasonable and the other unreasonable requires an independent
theory of jurisdiction that the reasonable anticipation test does not
supply.201 Such a theory would need to explain why the forum state
has different degrees of authority over two hackers who acted in the
same way with the same knowledge and same consequences.
Distinguishing the hackers based on “implied consent” would also
be unpersuasive. Implied consent suffers from the same flaws as
constructive presence.202 The existence of “consent” masquerades as
a fact question but is really a policy question that requires an
antecedent theory of what factors justify the assertion of state pow-
er. Once one develops that antecedent theory, the fiction of consent
becomes superfluous.203
Unlike the hackers’ motives, changing other variables in the
hypothetical scenario might raise relevant questions. For example,
suppose that one defendant either did not know that Acme had a
hub in Nevada, mistakenly believed it was attacking a different
corporation, or damaged the servers accidently while trying to
repair them. Alternatively, imagine that in one case the disruption
in Nevada was severe, while in another it was trivial. These sorts of
variations might affect the jurisdictional inquiry depending on how
one defines and weighs the relevant state and private interests. It
is those interests that should shape the jurisdictional inquiry rather
than the question of whether contacts were with the forum “itself.”
A hypothetical variant of Walden illustrates a similar point as the
hacker hypothetical. Suppose that Walden falsified his affidavit be-
cause he wanted revenge against Nevada residents after his beloved
Atlanta Braves baseball team lost to a team from Nevada.204 That
200. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
201. See id. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the reasonable anticipation
test is circular because the “defendant cannot know if his actions will subject him to jurisdic-
tion in another State until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction is”); Spencer, supra
note 17, at 646 (“[D]efendants will anticipate being ‘haled into court’ wherever the law says
they are subject to suit; thus, defining the law of jurisdiction with reference to the
expectations of defendants makes no sense.”).
202. See supra Part III.A.1.
203. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304
(1989) (“[T]heories of tacit consent assume almost exactly what they set out to prove.”).
204. Nevada lacks a Major League Baseball team, but we can hypothesize the “Reno Rat
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change in motive would be a thin reed on which to rest jurisdiction,
yet would be potentially dispositive in Walden’s calculus because the
contact with Nevada would cease to be the “fortuitous” result of
“unilateral” actions by others.205 Taken literally in the two hypothet-
ical scenarios above, Walden would suggest that Nevada would have
no power over a hacker whose intentional acts cause foreseeable
bedlam in Nevada but would have power over a police officer caus-
ing relatively minor harm due to a petty sports rivalry. That would
be a curious implementation of “due process.” Jurisdiction should be
available either in both scenarios because of the local effects of an
intentional tort or in only the hacking scenario because of the
relatively severe local effects. Yet Walden’s forum/resident distinc-
tion implies that geographically tinged motives have greater consti-
tutional salience than the foreseeable consequences of intentional
misconduct.
In sum, searching the record for contacts “with the forum” rather
than “with residents” is a pointless and distracting exercise. The fo-
rum/resident distinction is imprecise, inappropriately formal, lacks
a normative foundation, and obscures salient indicia of state author-
ity. Analyzing personal jurisdiction is hard enough without an
unnecessary layer of specious distinctions. Part III.B therefore
considers alternative distinctions that should matter in the juris-
dictional calculus.
3. Salvaging the Forum/Resident Distinction: Linking
Jurisdiction and Limits on the Extraterritorial Application
of State Law
Lower courts can implement the unhelpful forum/resident
distinction in two ways. One option would be for courts to treat
Walden as merely a minor gloss on International Shoe. Given the
maneuvering room in Walden,206 courts can rely on International
Shoe’s functional integration of state interests and individual liberty
Pack.”
205. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123, 1125-26 (2014).
206. See supra Part II.B.4.
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to avoid the pitfalls of treating the forum/resident distinction liter-
ally and acontextually.207 I explore this possibility in Part III.B.
Another approach would also be consistent with Walden’s holding:
courts adjudicating effects cases could blend inquiries into prescrip-
tive jurisdiction (a state’s power to apply its law) and adjudicative
jurisdiction (a state’s power to provide a forum).208 The argument for
this approach proceeds in four steps.
First, adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction are closely related
historically and conceptually. Early personal jurisdiction doctrine
arose from choice of law theories, was fodder for choice of law
scholars, and was taught in choice of law courses.209 That linkage
makes sense. At a high level of abstraction, constitutional limits on
adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction serve the same purpose:
limiting the geographic reach of state power in a federal system
while recognizing that state borders are an imperfect proxy for the
legitimate reach of state institutions.210 Chief Justice Stone illus-
trated the conceptual nexus with his overlapping analysis of
prescriptive jurisdiction to impose taxes in Curry and adjudicative
jurisdiction to enforce taxes in International Shoe.211
Second, constitutional limits on prescriptive and adjudicative
jurisdiction arguably should be similar (if not identical) in effects
207. See supra Part III.A.1.
208. For the finer points of the distinction, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
209. See Rutherglen, supra note 180, at 350-53. More recently, personal jurisdiction has
been compartmentalized as a civil procedure topic, which may have subtly shaped how rules
evolved. See Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at 72-74 (discussing how the
“exile of personal jurisdiction doctrine from the canonical understanding of constitutional law
... influences how judges and lawyers understand and shape” doctrine).
210. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 582-83 (2008). The
Supreme Court has at various times recognized similarities and differences between consti-
tutional limits on prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 224-25 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I recognize that
the jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiries are not identical.... But I would not compartmen-
talize thinking in this area quite so rigidly as it seems to me the Court does today, for both
inquiries ‘are often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar consid-
erations.’” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting))); infra
note 240.
211. See supra Part III.A.1.c. Justice Black similarly blended analysis of prescriptive and
adjudicative jurisdiction precedents in a subsequent case that cited International Shoe. See
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1950)
(considering how the Due Process Clause applies “where business activities reach out beyond
one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state”).
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cases when defendants are outsiders. International Shoe explains
that outsiders may subject themselves to state power when their
“activity” undermines “the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”212
That statement emphasizes two competing interests: the defen-
dant’s interest in being immunized from jurisdiction that is unwar-
ranted by the scope of its activity213 and the state’s interest in
acquiring jurisdiction based on activity relevant to its “laws.”214 A
sensible way to address these interests in effects cases would be to
ask: would the Constitution permit the state to apply its law based
on the local effects of the defendant’s intentionally tortious conduct?
If the state could apply its law to the defendant,215 even if the
state chooses not to,216 the only additional issue would be whether
the burden of compelling the defendant’s appearance would be
212. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
213. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 708
(1983) (contending that the “fair and orderly” language focuses on the defendant’s interests
rather than the state’s interests).
214. See Stein, supra note 17, at 698 n.48 (“Read in conjunction with the Court’s
authorization of specific jurisdiction based on a limited or single contact ... the importance of
the state’s regulatory concerns becomes apparent.”); Wechsler, supra note 186, at 784
(characterizing Chief Justice Stone’s jurisdiction decisions as “insistent that the issue was
solely the question of power; that where local interest provided a basis for action, the pre-
vention of inequity in the impact of legislation was not, as such, the business of the Court”).
Chief Justice Stone’s reference to state interests in International Shoe was part of a larger
project to reduce constitutional constraints on state authority. See Stephen Gardbaum, New
Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 489 (1997).
215. An interesting problem would arise if state law would apply to only a subset of the
claims against the defendant. Adjudication of all claims in the forum would be appropriate
only under the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has never
expressly endorsed. The basic idea is that if a long arm statue authorizes jurisdiction over one
claim, it may implicitly authorize jurisdiction over all related claims. The same reasoning
could apply if state interests rooted in prescriptive jurisdiction justify adjudicative jurisdiction
over only some of the plaintiff ’s claims. For a discussion of pendent personal jurisdiction, see
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 243-52 (2014); Linda Sandstrom Simard,
Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619 (2001).
216. Whether the state would apply its law is a separate question. For example, a state
might adopt a long-arm statute that asserts the maximum constitutional reach in order to
protect local plaintiffs, while also adopting a deferential choice of law regime in order to
promote interstate comity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(a), (c) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1971) (suggesting that the forum state should consider the interests of other
states).
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excessive.217 Concerns about burdens could be addressed through a
separate constitutional inquiry into the fairness of venue.218 Person-
al jurisdiction would therefore be proper whenever the state could
apply its law.
In contrast, when the local effects of conduct outside the forum do
not create a constitutionally sufficient state interest in applying
state law, then the state arguably should not be able to compel an
outsider to appear.219 A state might try to justify adjudicative juris-
diction even if foreign law must apply by asserting an interest in
providing a convenient local forum for its residents. However, the
seemingly benevolent act of providing a forum for the plaintiff is an
exercise of coercive power over the defendant backed by the threat
of an enforceable judgment if the defendant fails to appear. That
power must be consistent with the Constitution. Assuming that the
217. I assume that if state law applied, it would do so because of a state interest, rather
than by default due to the absence of conflicting laws from other jurisdictions. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985) (“There can be no injury in applying [the
forum’s] law if it is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.”).
When state law applies by default, a separate analysis of adjudicative jurisdiction would be
necessary.
218. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
219. Robert Leflar cautioned against assuming that the similar functions of doctrine
limiting prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction necessitate identical implementation in all
instances:
A conclusion that the requirements of fair play and substantial justice are sat-
isfied for one of these jurisdictional purposes affords some basis for argument
that they are satisfied for the others also; there is enough similarity among all
of them that a decision as to one of them ought not to be ignored in passing on
another. But the very nature of the requirements implies uniqueness. Fairness
and justice of course are relative things, not absolutes. What is fairest and most
just for one purpose may be less fair, less just, for another.
Robert A. Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PUB. L. 282, 292
(1960). I am skeptical about whether a sensible constitutional standard for prescriptive and
adjudicative jurisdiction in effects cases would ever allow one and not the other, but further
analysis would be necessary to confirm that hypothesis. For additional discussion of how the
Constitution might impose similar limits on prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, see
Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960
(1981); Korn, supra note 170; Earl M. Maltz, Visions of Fairness—The Relationship Between
Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 751 (1988); James Martin, Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980); Linda Silberman, Reflections on
Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for
Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569 (1991); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163 (2013); Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law
Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (1988).
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Constitution provides relatively mild limits on choice of law,220 it is
difficult to imagine facts that would justify interpreting the Consti-
tution to mean that: (1) the local effects of intentional misconduct
are insufficient to justify the extension of state law to extraterrito-
rial behavior; but (2) are sufficient to justify summoning an outsider
to appear in the forum and compelling other states to give “Full
Faith and Credit” to the ensuing judgment.221 If the Constitution
were reinterpreted to sharply limit prescriptive jurisdiction, then
states might have a stronger argument for providing a forum even
when they could not apply their law.
Third, the Court in Walden might have harbored unstated con-
cerns about whether the Constitution would have allowed Nevada
to apply its law to a tortious deprivation of property in Georgia.222
Current constitutional doctrine imposes minimal limits on prescrip-
tive jurisdiction, such that applying Nevada’s tort law would not
have been beyond the pale.223 But even the modern lenient standard
has boundaries. The Court has held that “if a State has only an
insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transac-
tion, application of its law is unconstitutional.”224 Walden concluded
that the defendant had no “meaningful” contact with Nevada and
that his conduct did not have “anything to do with Nevada.”225 One
must wonder how in those circumstances Nevada law could displace
Georgia law.226
220. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
221. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. I assume that local effects would be the sole basis for personal
jurisdiction. If jurisdiction were instead based on the defendant’s insider status, presence, or
consent, then adjudicative jurisdiction may exist even when prescriptive jurisdiction is not
available. See supra notes 8, 43.
222. An extra complication in Walden is that the suit arose under federal law. There was
no reason to think that Nevada would want to apply its own law or would even have any law
to apply. However, in federal question cases Congress has decided that federal courts should
essentially pretend that they are state courts for the purpose of analyzing personal jurisdic-
tion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). That fiction could include assuming that the state was the
source of the governing law or that the state was attempting to apply a local analogue to
federal law.
223. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305, 313-19 (1981) (plurality opinion) (up-
holding application of Minnesota law to govern an insurance policy issued in Wisconsin to a
Wisconsin resident who died after an accident in Wisconsin involving other Wisconsin
residents).
224. Id. at 310-11.
225. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
226. The plurality’s holding in Hague might permit application of Nevada law because the
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If Nevada could apply its law even after Walden, the Constitution
would have a strange meaning. The local suffering of a local resi-
dent would give Nevada a constitutionally sufficient reason to apply
its law to conduct that occurred entirely in Georgia, but the fact that
the conduct occurred in Georgia would prevent Nevada from provid-
ing a judicial remedy. Worse, the Constitution would be more suspi-
cious of Nevada helping a local citizen obtain convenient access to
justice than of Nevada regulating conduct in Georgia. Those prior-
ities seem backward.227 One might try to justify this counterintuitive
support for local law without a local remedy by stressing the defen-
dant’s interests in avoiding a burdensome forum. But Nevada was
not a burdensome forum,228 and in any event burdens can be ad-
dressed in a separate inquiry focused on venue rather than juris-
diction.229
Walden’s rejection of adjudicative jurisdiction in Nevada might
therefore suggest that Nevada would also have lacked prescriptive
jurisdiction. Even if current choice of law precedent might justify
applying Nevada’s law,230 that precedent is based on a thirty-four
year old plurality decision that the Court has not cited in the past
twelve years.231 Walden’s dismissive treatment of Nevada’s contacts
with the dispute casts doubt on whether the current Court would
view state interests in the choice of law context as generously as
past precedent.
Finally, in future cases where the local effects of the defendant’s
conduct outside the forum justifies application of the forum’s law,
plaintiffs resided in Nevada and used Nevada’s government services. See Hague, 449 U.S. at
313-20 (plurality opinion). It is not clear that the Court would still endorse Hague’s emphasis
on the plaintiff ’s contacts with the forum. See infra note 231.
227. See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33,
88 (1978) (“To believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state should be stronger
under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe
that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.”).
228. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Officer Walden might have been concerned
that a Nevada court would be biased in favor of local gamblers and against an out-of-state
defendant. However, citing bias as a basis for rejecting jurisdiction over outsider defendants
begs the question of why outsider plaintiffs must then risk bias by suing in the defendant’s
home state.
229. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 226.
231. The Court last cited Hague in a case that noted the “weakness” of a state’s interest in
applying its law. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 426 (2003).
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one might say that the defendant has “contact with the forum
State.”232 Law is a manifestation of the state, and thus entangle-
ment with state law might be what the Court meant in Walden
when it distinguished contact with state residents from contact with
the state itself. The existence of prescriptive jurisdiction would then
signal that adjudicative jurisdiction is also appropriate (again, leav-
ing room for consideration of whether the venue would be burden-
some).
Reading Walden to focus on contacts with state law is consistent
with Nicastro. The Nicastro plurality stated that in an “intentional
tort” case, “the defendant might well fall within the State’s authority
by reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws.”233 Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent likewise stressed the relevance of state interests and
“choice-of-law considerations” to assessing personal jurisdiction.234
However, the plurality avoided the question of how far prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction blur, noting that “[a] sovereign’s legis-
lative authority to regulate conduct may present considerations
different from those presented by its authority to subject a defen-
dant to judgment in its courts.”235 Accordingly, Nicastro does not
require reading Walden’s focus on “contacts with the forum State”
as referencing the applicability of state law. Nevertheless, reading
Walden’s reference to “the State” to mean “the State’s laws” may
reflect the Justices’ underlying concerns. That reading is especially
sensible if one assumes that the Court did not intend to revive the
type of formal analysis that International Shoe rejected.236
232. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
233. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion).
Allan Stein has defended a similar argument in the context of jurisdiction over Internet activ-
ities, contending that “the appropriate jurisdictional inquiry is not whether a defendant has
surrendered his or her liberty, but whether the state’s assertion of judicial authority suf-
ficiently advances its regulatory interests to justify the attendant burden that such a
proceeding would impose upon conduct outside of its territory.” Stein, supra note 176, at 413.
234. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion). An earlier decision had noted, without analysis, that
a defendant’s lack of contacts with the forum would preclude jurisdiction “even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy.” World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). The meaning of this statement is ambiguous. If
the defendant truly had no contacts with the forum, then it is difficult to imagine why the
forum’s interest in applying its law would be strong unless the court meant “interest” in the
sense of “desire” rather than “entitlement.”
236. See supra Part III.A.1.
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Whether linking the constitutional tests for prescriptive and ad-
judicative jurisdiction in effects cases would be wise in all circum-
stances depends on normative questions beyond the scope of this
Article.237 The link also assumes that the Court will preserve the
current lenient constitutional limits on choice of law. If the Court
were to substantially cabin states’ prescriptive jurisdiction, then
expanding their adjudicative jurisdiction might become more
attractive.
Courts would also need to analyze precisely what the Nicastro
plurality meant when it referred to actions that “obstruct [state]
laws.” That novel phrase does not appear to have a foundation in
precedent.238 A natural reading, which this Section assumes, is that
the plurality was referring to conduct within the state’s prescriptive
jurisdiction.239 But an alternative possibility is that the plurality
used state “law” in a more colloquial sense of state “interests.” This
emphasis on interests rather than choice of law would be consistent
with dicta in prior decisions that treated prescriptive and adjudica-
tive jurisdiction as distinct issues (despite their conceptual over-
lap).240 If Nicastro suggests that adjudicative jurisdiction in effects
237. For a discussion of whether and how constitutional limits on prescriptive and adjud-
icative jurisdiction should overlap, see sources cited supra note 219.
238. Some nineteenth-century decisions invoked the concept of obstructed law in ways that
Justice Kennedy presumably did not intend. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126
(1866) (“If armies were collected in Indiana, they were to be employed in another locality,
where the laws were obstructed and the national authority disputed.”); Smith v. Turner, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283, 440 (1849) (“Our first step towards establishing an independent govern-
ment was by the Declaration of Independence. By that act it was declared that the British
king had endeavored to prevent the population of the colonies by obstructing the laws for the
naturalization of foreigners.”); cf. Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme
Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 359 n.82
(2012) (characterizing Nicastro’s obstruction language as “ambiguous and extraneous”).
239. Cf. SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Nicastro and
exercising personal jurisdiction because “the Defendants here allegedly engaged in conduct
that was designed to violate United States securities regulations and was thus necessarily di-
rected toward the United States”).
240. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984) (“The question of the
applicability of New Hampshire’s statute of limitations to claims for out-of-state damages
presents itself in the course of litigation only after jurisdiction over respondent is established,
and we do not think that such choice-of-law concerns should complicate or distort the
jurisdictional inquiry.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (“The issue is personal
jurisdiction, not choice of law.”); cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481-82
(1985) (noting that although “choice-of-law analysis—which focuses on all elements of a
transaction, and not simply on the defendant’s conduct—is distinct from minimum-contacts
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cases hinges on obstruction of state interests rather than the state’s
prescriptive jurisdiction, then Walden’s forum/resident may require
greater attention to state interests for the reasons discussed below
in Part III.B.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that: (1) lower courts are
stuck with Walden’s command to identify contacts with the forum
state rather than contacts with its residents; (2) that imprecise
distinction has two equally unhelpful variations and if taken liter-
ally would revive Pennoyer-era formalism; but (3) the requirement
of contacts with “the State” is salvageable in effects cases if courts
consider the defendant’s interaction with and obstruction of state
law; and (4) reading Walden in this way would resonate with con-
cerns expressed by seven Justices in Nicastro. Alternatively, the
forum/resident distinction may require considering whether the
defendant’s conduct implicates the forum’s interests, which is the
subject of the next Section.
B. Overlooked Factors that Should Guide the Effects Test: The
Importance of State Regulatory Interests When Out-of-State
Conduct Causes Local Effects
The prior Section suggests that Walden adds little to Calder. Al-
though Walden seemed to introduce a new emphasis on “contacts
with the forum,” that test turns out to be imprecise and incoherent
(unless linked to prescriptive jurisdiction). A more challenging fact
pattern than what the Court confronted in Walden would expose the
opinion’s hollowness and require additional analysis. Yet Calder
also was unclear, so where does that leave lower courts?
This Section explores how courts should consider three critical
factors in effects cases: the forum state’s interests, the extent to
which intentional misconduct that is not geographically targeted
jurisdictional analysis—which focuses at the threshold solely on the defendant’s purposeful
connection to the forum,” a contractual choice-of-law clause was a factor supporting personal
jurisdiction). But cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305, 317 n.23 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (noting that adjudicative jurisdiction is “a factor not without significance in assessing
the constitutionality of [the forum state’s] choice of its own substantive law”); Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-304 (1942) (pre-International Shoe decision blending analy-
sis of Nevada’s power to apply its marital relations law and its power to compel a nonresident
spouse to appear in a divorce action).
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can still warrant jurisdiction, and the relevance of reckless rather
than willful targeting. Further scholarship can develop each argu-
ment in light of competing normative theories about why the
Constitution limits adjudicative jurisdiction.241
1. Nature and Extent of Local Injury: Reimagining Walden as a
Case About Ebola
The central feature of an effects case is the effect itself. Without
the local effect, there would be little reason to think that jurisdic-
tion exists. The case would involve an outsider acting outside the
forum and causing injury outside the forum. The only possible nexus
with the forum would be the plaintiff (if he resides or is domiciled
there). But if the plaintiff ’s injuries have no local effects, it is dif-
ficult to see how the forum would have an interest in exercising
jurisdiction that trumps the defendant’s interests (as well as the
interests of other potential fora).242
State regulatory interests are relevant under modern personal
jurisdiction doctrine, as they should be.243 State interests were also
increasingly salient as the Pennoyer regime crumbled before Inter-
national Shoe finally swept it aside.244 Yet the role of state interests
in the jurisdictional calculus is unclear. For example, the Supreme
241. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
242. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (rejecting jurisdiction when the plaintiff ’s
residence was the forum’s sole relevant contact with the dispute). But see Walter W. Heiser,
A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 963
(2000) (“The plaintiff ’s choice of forum based solely on the plaintiff ’s residence seems no less
reasonable and fair than a plaintiff ’s choice of forum based on the defendant’s residence.”).
243. See Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, supra note 17, at 61-67. But see Harold S. Lewis,
Jr., The “Forum State Interest” Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court
Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769, 771 (1982) (contending that “in-
terests of government should not figure at all in decisions on personal jurisdiction”).
244. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935) (holding that “[t]he
power of the states to impose terms upon nonresidents, as to activities within their borders”
justified statute authorizing personal jurisdiction over foreign business with a local agent);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (holding that “public interest” in regulating “dan-
gerous machines” justified state statute subjecting nonresident motorists to personal jurisdic-
tion in suits arising from local accidents). Pennoyer had created an exception to the presence
requirement for suits about marital status, see supra note 169, which the Court later justified
as stemming from the forum’s “large interest” in protecting a locally domiciled spouse, marital
property, and marital offspring. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (uphold-
ing personal jurisdiction in a divorce action against a nonresident spouse).
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Court emphasized state interests in cases when defendants tried to
circumvent the forum’s workers’ compensation regime,245 engaged
in activity regulated by a state insurance commissioner,246 and made
libelous statements in a locally distributed publication.247 Yet the
Court gave state interests little or no weight in cases involving a
local car accident248 and a local industrial accident.249 The Court’s
inconsistent treatment of state interests could in theory suggest a
subtle pattern or trend, but more likely illustrates a lack of consen-
sus and the doctrine’s subjective indeterminacy.250
State interests will vary in effects cases depending on the nature
and severity of the foreign conduct’s local consequences. Potentially
relevant factors include the extent to which local effects: (1) frus-
trate state regulatory objectives; (2) burden state institutions; (3)
consume state resources; and (4) injure the state’s economy. Even
harms to private individuals can implicate public interests. For
example, physical injury may require convalescence in a public hos-
pital and payments from a state insurance fund, while economic in-
jury may lead to local unemployment or a reduction in exports.251
245. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945) (discussing the state’s “taxing
power”).
246. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“California has a manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims.”).
247. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1984) (stressing “the combi-
nation of New Hampshire’s interest in redressing injuries that occur within the State and its
interest in cooperating with other States in the application of the ‘single publication rule’”).
The plaintiff in Keeton had only a single connection to New Hampshire: “the circulation there
of copies of a magazine that she assists in producing.” Id. at 772. She sued in New Hampshire
because it was the only state where the statute of limitations had not expired. Id. at 773.
248. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980). The plaintiffs’
brief stressed that victims were “hospitalized” in the forum for “over five months” due to
“mutilating and disabling injuries” and were still “confined” there at the time of suit. Brief of
Respondent at 3, 21, Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (No. 78-1078). The Court never mentioned the
extensive local medical treatment. Instead, the opinion described the accident and its conse-
quences in one sentence. See Woodson, 444 U.S. at 288.
249. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that despite a “strong” interest in protecting local citizens, New Jersey was
“without power” to exercise jurisdiction over the manufacturer of a product that caused an
injury in New Jersey after the manufacturer actively marketed it to the entire United States).
250. The Court also lacks a clear theory of what constitutes a legitimate state interest. See
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 105-07.
251. See Heiser, supra note 242, at 960-68 (discussing how state and private interests
overlap).
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A striking feature of Walden is that it makes no effort to consider
Nevada’s interests. This omission creates the misleading impression
that those interests were irrelevant. Ignoring state interests had no
effect on the outcome in Walden because Nevada’s interests were
marginal: the plaintiffs’ local injuries were small, temporary, and
had no apparent ripple effects that might concern Nevada’s regu-
lators. Several states even filed amicus briefs denying that they
would want to provide a forum in a similar case.252 Accordingly,
Walden’s truncated inquiry may illustrate Justice Blackmun’s con-
cern that “easy cases make bad law.”253
But what if the local injury had been severe such that Nevada’s
interests were stronger? Analyzing a hypothetical variation of Wal-
den shows how little guidance the decision provides.
Suppose that when Walden encountered the plaintiffs in Atlanta,
he was not working with the DEA searching for drugs. Instead, he
was staffing a checkpoint screening for incoming travelers showing
symptoms of Ebola. At the checkpoint, Walden intentionally and
surreptitiously exposed the plaintiffs to an item that he knew to be
contaminated with the Ebola virus. His motive was simply to be
malicious and he picked the plaintiffs at random. His knowledge of
the plaintiffs’ connection to Nevada was the same as in the actual
case: he knew that they were en route to Las Vegas. The plaintiffs
then continued on their journey, eventually gambling in several Las
Vegas casinos. They did not contract Ebola because, despite Wal-
den’s best efforts, the virus never moved from the infected item to
the plaintiffs. But Nevada health officials learned of the plaintiffs’
potential exposure and quarantined them along with several other
people whom the plaintiffs encountered. The two-week quarantine
generated a media frenzy. Images of workers in haz-mat suits scrub-
bing casino tables were ubiquitous on cable news channels. An
ensuing wave of fear scared away tourists and wounded Nevada’s
economy.254 Hotels, restaurants, and casinos furloughed employees,
252. See Brief of Alabama et al., supra note 109, at 1-2.
253. O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
254. This scenario unfortunately is not far-fetched, as even a small perceived risk of a seri-
ous disease can distort consumer behavior. See Susanna Kim, How Fear of Ebola Could
Impact the U.S. Economy, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014, 8:31 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
fear-ebola-impact-us-%20economy/story?id=25915737 [http://perma.cc/C2DR-YUBZ].
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tax revenues plummeted, and the state’s emergency preparedness
budget was decimated. Plaintiffs then sued Walden in Las Vegas for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Ebola hypothetical is identical to the actual Walden case in
all jurisdictionally-relevant respects but one. In both the hypotheti-
cal and actual case, the defendant resided in Georgia, acted in Geor-
gia, reported to supervisors in Georgia, knew that his actions were
wrong, knew that he was interacting with people en route to Neva-
da, could easily anticipate that his actions would cause harm in
Nevada, did not care about the Nevada connection, was connected
to Nevada only because that is where plaintiffs unilaterally chose to
go, and did not send anything to Nevada (because the virus never
left the airport). Yet the harm in the hypothetical is many orders of
magnitude more severe than in the actual case.
There is not one word in Walden that would directly help a court
distinguish the Ebola hypothetical from the actual case. Yet it is
difficult to imagine that the forum’s extraordinary interest would be
irrelevant. The defendant’s obstruction of Nevada’s laws would be
a contact with the state justifying jurisdiction.255 The states collec-
tively would presumably support jurisdiction. One would not expect
to see seventeen states join an amicus brief, as they did in Walden,
opposing jurisdiction and asserting that Nevada’s interests were
“pure happenstance.”256 And the Supreme Court would be unlikely
to hold unanimously that Nevada had not even a little bit of “con-
tact” with a person who threatened to unleash a plague and caused
havoc within the state.
Walden’s silence about state interests highlights the importance
of the maneuvering room that I identified in Part II.B.4. Courts
confronting future cases involving significant local harms would
need to focus on Walden’s references to “meaningful” and “proper”
connections with the state as the entry point for considering the
forum’s interests.257 State interests may not be dispositive in the
multi-factor calculus, but they are relevant.258
255. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing how intentional conduct causing injury in the forum
may create meaningful contacts between the defendant and the state’s laws).
256. Brief of Alabama et al., supra note 109, at 5.
257. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124-25 (2014).
258. The relevance of state interests would be even clearer if courts analyzed personal
jurisdiction the way they analyze other due process problems. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
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The fact that state interests are not dispositive means that future
cases might still be difficult. For example, suppose in the hypotheti-
cal Ebola scenario that the plaintiffs traveled to California after
landing in Las Vegas, that the defendant did not know the plaintiffs
would have contacts with California, and that the quarantine oc-
curred in Los Angeles instead of Las Vegas. The defendant’s lack of
knowledge might matter or might not.259 Even in the relatively
simple hypothetical in which injuries occurred in Nevada, the defen-
dant might still argue that the state’s interests are insufficient to
warrant jurisdiction if he did not target the state. That defense
would raise the questions I address in the next two Sections about
whether targeting matters.
2. Assumption of Jurisdictional Risk: The Defendant’s
Knowledge that Her Conduct Is Wrongful and Could Lead to
Litigation
Personal jurisdiction doctrine often relies on the concept of “rea-
sonable anticipation.” Jurisdiction may be appropriate when the
defendant can “reasonably anticipate being haled into court,”260 in
contrast to when contacts with the forum are “random, fortuitous,
or attenuated.”261 But what exactly must the defendant anticipate
in effects cases that require evidence of conduct “aimed” at the
forum?262
The reasonable anticipation test obscures three distinct dimen-
sions of a defendant’s knowledge: (1) knowledge that the defendant
might be sued; (2) knowledge that the suit will occur in a specific
U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used ... and finally, the Govern-
ment’s interest.”). For discussion of the tension between treating personal jurisdiction as a
substantive due process problem that fits poorly with substantive due process precedent and
as a procedural due process problem that fits poorly with current personal jurisdiction prece-
dent, see Weinstein, supra note 17, at 230-40.
259. See infra Part III.B.2-3; see also Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 (expressing concern that
allowing jurisdiction in Nevada would also allow jurisdiction in “California, Mississippi, or
wherever else [the plaintiffs] might have traveled”).
260. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
261. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 (1985) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
262. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
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forum; and (3) knowledge that the defendant’s contacts with the
forum will be sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. The
Court explicitly focused only on the latter two dimensions—pre-
dicting contacts with the forum263 and predicting the legal suffi-
ciency of those contacts.264 Anticipation of contacts with the forum
might sometimes be relevant to jurisdiction, as noted in the next
Section. But considering the defendant’s expectations about legal
sufficiency is circular because the law shapes expectations.265 In any
event, often lost in the shuffle is the critical inquiry into anticipa-
tion of suit, even if the specific forum is unpredictable.266
Two hypothetical scenarios illustrate why the distinction be-
tween predicting a suit and predicting the forum is important. First,
imagine that a terrorist in Ohio attaches a bomb to an autonomous
drone designed to fly a randomly generated flight pattern for twelve
hours before exploding on impact with the ground. The bomber
cannot predict the state in which the bomb will explode; any nearby
state is a possibility (or no state, if the drone reaches Canada). Nor
does he care where injuries occur; all he wants is carnage and he
enjoys the uncertainty about where the drone will go. The bomb
eventually maims a person in Michigan, leading to a suit in Mich-
igan against the Ohio defendant. Second, imagine that an author in
Ohio writes a book that he honestly believes is original but in fact
subconsciously reproduces copyrighted work by an author in
Michigan. The Michigan author sues the Ohio author in Michigan.
In both scenarios, the defendants challenge personal jurisdiction be-
cause they could not predict that an injury would occur in Michigan.
263. See, e.g., id. at 789-90 (noting in course of reasonable anticipation analysis that defen-
dant knew that the target of its conduct resided in the forum); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 (linking
reasonable anticipation finding to fact that defendant “deliberately exploited” the forum
state’s market).
264. For example, in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978), the Court held that
a father could not “reasonably have anticipated” being sued for child support in California.
But the mother and child were in California, so California was not a surprising forum. See id.
Instead, the father claimed to have been surprised that his “single act” of “acquiesc[ing]” to
the child’s living arrangements in California would make him amenable to suit in California.
Id. The Court thus focused on anticipation in the sense of knowing what conduct triggers ju-
risdiction, rather than knowing where jurisdiction would be sought.
265. See supra note 201.
266. Calder observed that the defendant’s conduct was “calculated to cause injury.” Calder,
465 U.S. at 791. However, this observation was not directly linked to the reasonable anticipa-
tion inquiry.
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Should both defendants win, at least with respect to the reasonable
anticipation component of the inquiry?
The scenarios are materially distinct because the author likely
could not predict that an injury would occur anywhere, while the
bomber knew that an injury was likely to occur somewhere. There
is no plausible constitutional value that would shield the bomber
from Michigan courts simply because he did not know that Michigan
would be the situs of the mayhem that he hoped to inflict.267 The
rationale for the reasonable anticipation test is that it enables de-
fendants to “structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.”268 But intentional tortfeasors have an easy way to
avoid jurisdictional ambiguity: they can refrain from committing
intentional torts when they are unable to predict the results. In
contrast, authors working in good faith who do not anticipate any
litigation should not refrain from writing books, so perhaps the ob-
livious infringer deserves additional protection from distant fora.269
Accordingly, a meaningful application of the “reasonable anticipa-
tion” test should be able to distinguish between the bombing and
copyright infringement hypotheticals. These scenarios suggest that
a salient factor should be anticipation of litigation somewhere, rath-
er than in a specific place. Jurisdiction might still be unavailable for
other reasons—such as the burden of travel or lack of meaningful
forum interests—but not for lack of reasonable anticipation.
The bombing hypothetical also suggests that courts adjudicating
effects cases should consider whether the defendant assumed juris-
dictional risk. In other words, knowing that her actions could cause
injury somewhere, but not knowing where, did the defendant act
anyway? If so, the defendant assumed the risk of being sued where
the harm ultimately occurred. The same analysis could apply to the
267. The Court’s concern about insulating defendants from personal jurisdiction based on
the “‘unilateral activity’ of a third party” would not be an issue if the drone is treated as the
defendant’s agent or instrumentality. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014) (citation
omitted). For a broader discussion of liability issues in cases involving autonomous artificial
intelligence, such as a drone that can select its own flight path, see David C. Vladeck,
Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117
(2014).
268. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
269. See supra note 18.
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defendant in the Ebola hypothetical from the previous Section: in-
tentionally exposing travelers to a deadly virus assumes the risk of
jurisdiction in the places to which they travel. The idea here is not
that the defendant has fictionally consented to state authority, but
rather that she lacks a compelling objection to being forced to bear
the jurisdictional consequences of her behavior.
An assumption of risk theory would be partially consistent with
two of the Court’s stated concerns about jurisdictional rules. First,
the Court believes that actors should be able to use predictions
about jurisdiction to “structure their primary conduct.”270 Second,
actors should have “fair warning that a particular activity may sub-
ject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”271 These goals
usually translate into a requirement that the actor “has ‘purpose-
fully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum,”272 although
the semantics differ in effects cases.273 But the link between
predictability and purposeful direction makes less sense when activ-
ities are not directed toward any particular place or when there is
a risk that costs will spill over beyond the borders of a targeted
forum. At that point, the fair warning and predictability goals may
tolerate forcing defendants to assume jurisdictional risk rather than
foisting added litigation burdens on plaintiffs. If potential defen-
dants do not like uncertainty, they can mitigate exposure by not
engaging in wrongful conduct that they know will cause harm.
The assumption of risk argument is weaker if we assume that
jurisdiction is often asserted in suits that lack merit. Efforts to
mitigate the risk of jurisdictional exposure could then entail a re-
duction in socially productive behavior. Courts might also consider
that allegations about a defendant’s wrongful intent are difficult to
270. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
271. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration in original)).
272. Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
273. Calder never mentions any variant of the word “purpose.” Notwithstanding this
silence, Walden characterizes Calder as having “rejected” an argument that the defendant’s
contacts were not “sufficiently purposeful.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 n.7 (2014).
Walden’s only other reference to purpose was the descriptive statement that “we have upheld
the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who have purposefully ‘reach[ed] out beyond’
their State and into another.” Id. at 1122 (citation omitted). Regardless of the semantics, both
Walden and Calder required conduct in some way directed at the forum. See supra Parts
II.A.2, II.B.2.
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prove. For example, in the Ebola hypothetical,274 the complaint
might allege that the officer acted maliciously even though his
conduct was an accident or never occurred at all. A rule allowing
jurisdiction based on allegations about intent to cause injury could
therefore impose substantial burdens that subsequent litigation on
the merits reveals were unwarranted. Concerns about resting juris-
diction on allegations that turn out to be meritless are not limited
to the effects context. But these concerns are often more salient in
effects cases because jurisdiction tends to rest primarily on the
central disputed merits question.275
The difficult choice for rulemakers is how to allocate risk given
that all potential jurisdictional rules have error costs. Courts have
two stark options (along with intermediate compromises): (1)
assume that the plaintiff ’s allegations are true and thus make
procedural decisions that could harm the defendant if the allega-
tions turn out to be false; or (2) assume that the allegations might
not be true and thus deprive the plaintiff of procedural opportuni-
ties that in hindsight may turn out to have been warranted. Under
conditions of factual uncertainty, any rule will privilege one set of
litigants at the expense of others. The relevant question is not
whether error will occur, but how courts should skew it. The analy-
sis in this Section suggests that an assumption of risk theory is
appropriate, at least absent empirical evidence that the rule would
impose unwarranted costs.276
The defendant’s assumption of jurisdictional risk does not nec-
essarily mean that jurisdiction is appropriate. Further questions
would arise. For example, courts might consider how predictable
litigation must be to justify jurisdiction in an unpredictable forum.
274. See supra Part III.B.1.
275. See Robertson, supra note 70, at 1305. The consequences of basing effects jurisdiction
on a false allegation of misconduct would be especially troubling if the suit challenges speech,
such that the prospect of jurisdiction might have a chilling effect on speech directed outside
the forum. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 215, at 255-56. The Court amplified this risk
by declining to conduct a separate First Amendment inquiry at the jurisdictional stage of a
libel action. See supra note 72.
276. Commentators have taken different approaches to allocating error costs. Compare
Robertson, supra note 70, at 1355-57 (favoring eliminating the effects test in part due to the
risk that jurisdiction will rest on false allegations), with Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional
Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1000 (2006) (seeking to balance the risk of jurisdictional errors
and merits errors without categorically precluding effects cases).
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The bombing and infringement hypotheticals are extremes, fea-
turing near certainty on the one hand and good faith ignorance on
the other; harder cases may arise in the middle. For example, sup-
pose that the hypothetical bomber was instead an amateur weather
enthusiast, and the bombs attached to the drone were instead
scientific instruments. The drone was programmed to follow the
wind, which was unpredictable, and then eventually return to its
launch site. In his haste to launch the drone, the weather enthusiast
attached the instruments with latches that he knew were weak. One
of the instruments accidently detached mid-flight and killed a
person on whom it landed in Michigan. Jurisdiction would depend
on whether deeming a reckless person with good intentions to have
assumed the risk of distant litigation is “reasonable, in the context
of our federal system of government.”277
Likewise, there may be normative reasons to cabin the assump-
tion of risk theory when litigation in the forum would be burden-
some.278 These refinements to the theory are subjects for another
article, although scholarship focused on horizontal federalism al-
ready calls into question the extent to which a defendant’s lack of
purposeful aiming toward the forum is dispositive if other factors
favor jurisdiction.279 For now, it suffices to say that courts analyzing
effects cases should consider whether the defendant could predict
that the effect would occur and generate litigation somewhere, even
if the specific forum was unpredictable.280
277. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
278. In tort law, for example, assumption of risk should not necessarily deprive an actor
of otherwise applicable legal protections. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assump-
tion of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 483-84 (2002) (discussing costs and benefits of the
assumption of risk doctrine).
279. See supra note 17.
280. An interesting example of this principle in action—that oddly does not cite Calder or
acknowledge the novelty of its reasoning—is Pugh v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2003). In Pugh, representatives of seven “Americans”
who died in the explosion of a French airplane flying between Congo and France sued Libyan
agents who had conspired to place a bomb on the aircraft. Id. at 56. The court exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction because the defendants “should have reasonably postulated that passengers
of many nationalities would be on board, from which they could also expect they might be
haled into the courts of those nations whose citizens would die.” Id. at 59. In a sense, the
bombers assumed the risk of being sued in the home fora of their victims, although the court
had no occasion to consider whether jurisdiction would exist even if the presence of U.S.
passengers came as a surprise. See id. (“Given the number of passengers on UTA Flight 772,
and the international nature of the flight, it was also altogether foreseeable that some
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Once again, Walden and Calder provide little guidance. Walden
links jurisdiction to conduct that is “tethered” to the forum in a
“meaningful way,”281 while Calder requires conduct “expressly
aimed” at the forum that is “calculated” to cause injury such that
the forum is the “focal point.”282 But in the assumption of risk scen-
ario, conduct is often calculated to cause injury but has no focal
point and no geographically-defined purpose. The scenario is differ-
ent from anything that the Court has considered. Existing precedent
is therefore not a straitjacket on lower courts, which must instead
reason from the foundational principles in International Shoe to
weigh the forum’s and the defendant’s competing interests.283
3. Reckless Entanglement with the Forum
Sections 1 and 2 suggest that the Due Process Clause may
tolerate jurisdiction in effects cases based on the severity of the local
injury and the defendant’s knowledge that her actions were
wrongful. That conclusion seems inconsistent with precedent given
the Court’s emphasis on the defendant’s purpose and intent. A
logical response might be to insist that willful targeting of the forum
is essential. This Section suggests otherwise.
Americans would be aboard the plane.”). This principle is also evident in other judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club, 34 F.3d 410, 411 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (noting in course of applying Calder to a trademark infringement suit
that “[b]y choosing a name that might be found to be confusingly similar” the defendant
“assumed the risk of injuring valuable property located in” the forum); Verizon Online Servs.,
Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 618-19 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding in course of applying
Calder that defendant who sent millions of spam emails through plaintiff ’s servers “assumed
the risk” of being “dragged into court where their actions caused the greatest injury”). But see
Ford Motor Co. v. Great Domains, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 763, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (deeming
an assumption of risk inquiry in a trademark infringement case to be inconsistent with
Calder’s “expressly aimed” test); cf. Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., No. 04-1173
(PLF), 2015 WL 967624, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2015) (citing Walden to reject personal juris-
diction over entities that allegedly aided terrorists who killed a forum resident in Israel; the
court found insufficient evidence that the defendants “focused on the United States” and did
not consider an assumption of risk theory).
281. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
282. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789, 791 (1984).
283. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“The test is not merely ...
whether the activity ... is a little more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”).
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Focusing on willful targeting obscures the many ways in which
foreign conduct may entangle an outsider with the forum. Along a
sliding scale, the outsider might purposefully target the forum, act
with indifference to a known risk of entanglement with the forum,
act based on a belief that consequences will not occur in the forum,
or fall somewhere between these positions.
The prior Section considered a scenario in which the defendant
did not target any forum and thus her conduct lacked any focal
point. This Section considers the situation in which a defendant’s
conduct does have a focal point but still causes harm somewhere
else.
We can again use two hypothetical scenarios to illustrate flaws in
the targeting inquiry’s narrow emphasis on a single dimension of a
multidimensional problem. First, imagine that a person standing in
Oregon along the border with California aims his rifle at a person
whom he knows to be in California, shoots, and causes injury. The
victim sues in California and the defendant has no California con-
tacts other than the shooting. The existence of jurisdiction seems
obvious. Indeed, this hypothetical is taken directly from an illustra-
tion of effects jurisdiction in section 37 of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts.284 Calder cited section 37 with apparent approval (al-
though it did not mention the shooting scenario).285
Second, imagine the same facts, but the shooter aims at a person
in Oregon, misses, and strikes a person in California whom the
shooter knew to be present but hoped not to hit. Further suppose
that the shooter is not an expert marksman and was aware that he
might miss the intended target. The victim then sues the shooter in
California.
If willful targeting of the forum is a prerequisite for personal ju-
risdiction, then there is jurisdiction in the first scenario but no
jurisdiction in the second. Yet California’s power should not depend
on whether the local victim was intentionally harmed rather than
284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.1971)
(“[O]ne who intentionally shoots a bullet into a state is as subject to the judicial jurisdiction
of the state as to causes of action arising from the effects of the shot as if he had actually fired
the bullet in the state.”).
285. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. A prior decision expressly declined to address the shooting
hypothetical. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978).
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recklessly harmed.286 From the state’s perspective, what matters is
that a person was shot within its borders. Likewise, the shooter
should not have a greater claim to jurisdictional immunity for the
foreseeable consequences of bad aim than for the intended conse-
quences of good aim.287
One of the many vices of Pennoyer v. Neff,288 which also involved
a wrongdoer in Oregon and a victim in California, is that the deci-
sion’s narrow focus on territorial borders precluded jurisdiction in
effects cases such as the two shooting hypotheticals.289 Replacing
rigid emphasis on territory with rigid emphasis on willful targeting
would recreate Pennoyer’s limits on state authority to provide a
remedy for intentional misconduct that causes local injuries.
The Court has never confronted a scenario analogous to the bad-
aim hypothetical and therefore has not considered whether a geo-
graphically-precise “purpose” is an essential prerequisite for juris-
diction in all effects cases.290 Accordingly, courts adjudicating effects
cases should consider the possibility that jurisdiction is appropriate
when intentional conduct produces foreseeable local effects indepen-
286. Cf. BioE LLC v. Mediatech, Inc., No. 10-2085 (MJD/FLN), 2011 WL 31727, at *5 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2011) (exercising personal jurisdiction in part based on the local effects of the
defendant’s “reckless misrepresentations” directed at a victim in the forum). Calder’s focus
on intentional torts is ambiguous when the relevant substantive law does not distinguish
between willful and reckless misconduct. See Steven M. Reiss, Applying the Effects Theory of
Personal Jurisdiction in Patent Infringement Actions, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 99, 103-04 (1995)
(exploring the concept of an “intentional infringer”).
287. If the shooting hypothetical arose in the context of assessing prescriptive rather than
adjudicative jurisdiction, the state in which the bullet landed would probably be able to apply
its criminal law. See Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1893) (holding that Georgia’s
criminal law applied to a defendant who, while standing in South Carolina, shot at and
missed a person in Georgia); State v. Hall, 19 S.E. 602, 604 (N.C. 1894) (holding that
Tennessee’s criminal law should apply to the defendant, who had a fired a shot in North
Carolina that killed a person in Tennessee).
288. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
289. See Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European
Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97 (1984) (arguing that Pennoyer’s
“undiscerning reliance on dogmatic considerations” precluded jurisdiction over “meritorious
causes where neither the defendant nor sufficient property could be found within the state”).
290. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion)
(“As a general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purpose-
fully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State’ .... There may
be exceptions, say, for instance, in cases involving an intentional tort.”) (citation omitted).
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dent of the defendant’s purpose, especially when state interests are
strong and the defendant knew that her conduct was wrongful.291
CONCLUSION
When a person in one state intentionally commits a tortious act
that has devastating consequences in another state, the victims
should be able to sue in a convenient local forum because juris-
diction would not violate due process (at least absent unusual
circumstances, and assuming that the venue would not be unduly
burdensome). Yet imprecise and undertheorized language in two
Supreme Court opinions suggests otherwise. This Article has shown
that Walden leaves more questions open than the opinion’s unanim-
ity might imply, such that courts still have substantial authority to
exercise personal jurisdiction in effects cases. In particular, the
Article: (1) highlights ambiguities in Calder and Walden; (2) ident-
ifies flaws in the Court’s imprecise requirement of “contacts with the
forum” and suggests that courts should read that language as per-
mitting jurisdiction based on contact with state law; and (3) dem-
onstrates that several factors may be more important than the
Court has so far acknowledged, including the magnitude of state
interests, the defendant’s assumption of jurisdictional risk, and the
predictable consequences of reckless action.
Walden was decided thirty years after Calder, which was decided
thirty-nine years after International Shoe. Lower courts may have
to wait a long time for additional authoritative guidance. In the in-
terim, the factors discussed in this Article could help in the thou-
sands of effects cases that will arise over the coming years.
291. See supra Part III.B.1-2.

